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MONTANA ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PRACTICE:
41 YEARS AFTER THE ENACTMENT OF THE MONTANA
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
William L. Corbett*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Montana Administrative Procedure Act (“MAPA”),1 enacted in
1971, was intended to simplify, unify, and clarify administrative practice in
Montana.  The MAPA is “loosely” based2 on the 1961 Revised Model State
Administrative Procedure Act (“the Model Act”).3  The Model Act was, in
turn, loosely patterned after the federal Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”), enacted in 1946.4  The Model Act was revised in 1981, and, again
in 2010.5  Yet, no analysis has followed these recent revisions.  The last
comprehensive analyses of the MAPA were in 19776 and 1980.7  The pur-
pose of this article is to provide a comprehensive update.
In a 1977 article, former University of Montana School of Law Profes-
sor John McCrory8 noted that the MAPA focuses on three aspects of admin-
istrative law and procedure: agency rulemaking, agency adjudication, and
judicial review of agency decisions.9  This article is principally organized to
* Professor of Law, The University of Montana School of Law.  The author greatly appreciated
the work of his assistant and Montana Law Review staff member, Stephanie Holstein, and Faculty Secre-
tary Wendy Owens.  Without their diligent work, this article would have not reached final form.
1. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 2–4–101 to 2–4–711 (2011).  The purpose of the Montana Administrative
Procedure Act is to:
(a) generally give notice to the public of governmental action and to provide for public partic-
ipation in that action;
(b) establish general uniformity and due process safeguards in agency rulemaking, legislative
review of rules, and contested case proceedings;
(c) establish standards for judicial review of agency rules and final agency decisions; and
(d) provide the executive and judicial branches of government with statutory directives.
Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–101(2).
2. John P. McCrory, Montana Administrative Procedures Study Part I: Report of Study on Mon-
tana Administrative Procedures & Proposal for a Montana Administrative Procedure Act 4, 110 (un-
published legislative study 1970) (copy on file with Mansfield Lib., U. of Mont., Missoula).
3. Id. at 9.
4. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2006).
5. Rev. Model St. Admin. Proc. Act (2010) (available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?
title=State%20Administrative%20Procedure%20Act,%20Revised%20Mode).
6. John P. McCrory, Administrative Procedures in Montana: A View after Four Years with the
Montana Administrative Procedure Act, 38 Mont. L. Rev. 1 (1977).
7. Montana Administrative Procedure Manual (Roger Tippy, ed., St. Bar of Mont. 1980).
8. Professor McCrory is a former University of Montana Law Professor and the author of a two-
part report on the proposed Administrative Procedure Act.
9. McCrory, supra n. 6 at 4.
1
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addresses these topics.  Where appropriate, the article also compares the
MAPA with the federal APA so that readers familiar with the APA may
draw comparisons.
General administrative procedure acts, like the MAPA, provide direc-
tives in the absence of specific procedural directives in individual agency
enabling or authorizing statutes.10  A legislative body may include proce-
dures specific to an agency, or agency action, in the legislation that creates
the agency.  Agency enabling or authorization legislation may contain all
the procedures necessary for the agency to act and may address all that
needs to be known about judicial review of such actions.  Specific legisla-
tive procedural directives contained in agency-authorizing legislation take
precedence over procedural directives in general administrative procedure
acts.11  Indeed, it is fair to think of general administrative procedure acts,
such as the MAPA, as providing generic, default administrative procedures
that apply only in the absence of specific procedures in the agency’s author-
izing or enabling legislation.12  Thus, for example, any agency procedures
contained in the Montana Clean Air Act take precedence over similar or
conflicting procedures contained in MAPA.13
II. DEFINING AN AGENCY UNDER THE MAPA
One of the most confusing aspects of the MAPA is the definition of the
word “agency.”  To qualify as a MAPA “agency,” a governmental entity
must satisfy three criteria.  The entity must: (1) be an instrumentality of
state government, as opposed to a state subdivision government; (2) not be
10. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise vol. I, § 1.1, 2 (4th ed., Aspen Law & Bus.
2002).  A statute enacted by a legislative body that creates or authorizes an agency to act is the agency’s
enabling or authorizing statute.  Such a statute authorizes the agency to perform certain prescribed func-
tions, and it may also establish the procedures that the agency is to use in enacting the procedures that
entities that come before the agency are to use, as well as provisions for judicial review of agency
decisions.  However, the legislative body that creates and authorizes the agency may not provide proce-
dural standards or for judicial review.  The purpose of administrative procedure acts is to fill that proce-
dural vacuum. Id.
11. Pickens v. Shelton-Thompson, 3 P.3d 603, 606 (Mont. 2000) (“Where a statute provides differ-
ent procedural requirements for judicial review of decisions from a specified agency, however, the
requirements of the specific statute prevail over the provisions of the MAPA.”) (citing Trustees, Carbon
County Sch. v. Spivey, 805 P.2d 61, 63 (Mont. 1991) (citing Dept. of Revenue v. Davidson Cattle Co.,
620 P.2d 1232, 1234 (Mont. 1980))).
12. The reason a legislative body may not provide procedural standards in the authorizing or ena-
bling legislation may be due to the fact that they did not think to do so, they specifically intended the
default procedures of the MAPA to apply, or they wanted to avoid a possible legislative controversy
surrounding any attempt to draft specific procedures, etc.
13. State v. Vainio, 35 P.3d 948, 953 (Mont. 2001) (when the legislature authorizes an agency to
adopt rules, but does not direct a specific rule-making procedure, the procedure mandated by MAPA
applies whether the authorizing statute refers to MAPA or MAPA rule-making).
2
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specifically exempt from MAPA coverage; and (3) have the authority to
make rules, determine contested cases, or enter into contracts.14
A. A MAPA Agency is an Instrumentality of the Montana
State Government
The definition of a MAPA agency is confusing because MAPA’s defi-
nition provision incorporates but limits the “agency” definition from the
Montana Public Participation in Governmental Operations Act (“Public
Participation Act”).  The Public Participation Act defines an agency as “any
board, bureau, commission, department, authority, or officer of the state or
local government.”15  MAPA adopted that definition except for the term
“local government.” Thus, MAPA applies to state boards, bureaus, commis-
sions, departments, authorities, and officers, but it does not apply to Mon-
tana state subdivision agencies.  For example, MAPA applies to the State
Superintendent of Public Instruction but not to county superintendents of
public instruction or to local school boards.
In 1982, the Montana Supreme Court misread the definition of a
MAPA “agency” and determined that the Montana State Superintendent of
Public Instruction and county superintendents of public instruction were
both MAPA agencies.16  It made this mistake by noting that MAPA, in part,
defines agency pursuant to the Public Participation Act, but the Court failed
to limit the definition to such instrumentalities of the state government.
The legislature responded.  During the 1985 legislative session, MAPA was
amended to provide that a MAPA agency does not include “a school dis-
trict, a unit of local government, or any other political subdivision of the
state.”17  This amendment clarified the existing MAPA definition of an
agency; MAPA applies only to agencies of the state government.
Simply because the Montana State Legislature authorizes the creation
of an agency does not make the agency a state MAPA agency, however.18
In a case shortly after the enactment of the MAPA, for example, the Mon-
tana Supreme Court was asked to determine whether a metropolitan police
commission created by the state legislature was a MAPA agency.19  The
Court determined, “[t]hough city police commissions are creations of state
14. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–102(2)(a) (providing that a MAPA agency is an agency, as defined in
§ 2–3–102, of a state government, except that it does not apply to the state board of pardons and parole;
youth penal institution; Montana university system; public works; and the public service commission).
15. Id. at § 2–3–102(1) (emphasis added).
16. Yanzick v. Bd. of Trustees of Sch. Dist. No. 23, 641 P.2d 431, 436 (Mont. 1982).
17. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–102(2)(b).
18. Miskovich v. City of Helena, 551 P.2d 995, 997 (Mont. 1976).
19. Id.
3
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statute, they are obviously entities of municipal government.”20  It noted
that it is the city that appoints the commissioners and determines their com-
pensation, and it is the duty of the commission to oversee the hiring and
discipline of municipal police officers, who are municipal employees.21
Thus, the commission was not a MAPA agency.
On occasion, it may be difficult to determine whether an agency is an
instrumentality of the state of Montana or, alternatively, some subdivision
of the state.  Critical factors in making this distinction are: who appoints
officers (a state official or city/county official22), who elects the officers
(state-wide or local electorate), the agency’s source of funding, and the ex-
tent of the agency’s jurisdiction.
B. State Instrumentalities Exempt from the MAPA
Some instrumentalities of the Montana state government are specifi-
cally exempted from MAPA coverage, so the second step in defining a
MAPA agency is determining whether an exception applies.  Consequently,
a MAPA agency is an instrumentality of state government but not all such
entities are MAPA agencies.
The first group of exemptions23 includes the legislature,24 the judici-
ary,25 the governor,26 and the state military.27  The second group of exemp-
tions includes: the state board of pardons and parole;28 the supervision and
administration of a penal institution; the board of regents and the Montana
university system; the financing, construction, and maintenance of public
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–3–102(1)(a)–(d).  The Public Participation Act excludes certain state
government entities, including the legislature, the judiciary, the governor, and the state military, from its
definition of an agency. Id. at § 2–4–102(2)(a).  These exemptions have been incorporated into the
MAPA definition of agency though its incorporation of the definition from the Public Participation Act.
24. Id. at § 2–3–102(1)(a).  The exemption for the legislature covers “the legislature and any
branch, committee, or officer thereof.” Id.
25. Id. at § 2–3–102(1)(b).  The judicial exemption reaches “the judicial branches and any commit-
tee or officer thereof.” Id.
26. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–3–102(1)(c).  The governor is excluded except to the extent that the
governor has been designated as a member of a specific agency.  Mont. Const. art. X, § 4; see also
Mont. Code Ann. § 77–1–201(2).  For example, the governor is designated as a member and president
of the State Lands Board.  The State Lands Board is a MAPA agency even though the governor is a
member of that Board. Id. at § 2–3–102(1)(c).
27. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–3–102(1)(d).  The military establishment exemption covers “state mili-
tary establishment and agencies concerned with civil defense and recovery from hostile attack.” Id.
28. Id. at § 2–4–102(2)(a)(i).  The State Board of Pardons and Parole is subject to certain provi-
sions of MAPA and its rules must be published in the Administrative Rules of Montana. Id.
4
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works; one function of the public service commission;29 and “a school dis-
trict, unit of local government, or any other political subdivision of the
state.”30
C. A MAPA Agency Must Make Rules, Determine Contested Cases, or
Enter into Contracts
The final criterion in defining a MAPA agency is that such an entity
must be “authorized by law to make rules, determine contested cases, or
enter into contracts.”31  But the MAPA does not specifically authorize an
agency to make rules, determine contested cases, or enter into contracts.32
An agency has such authority only if it was so authorized by the legislature
or the Montana Constitution.  Although the legislature creates and autho-
rizes most state agencies, some state agencies were created by the Montana
Constitution—e.g., the Montana State Lands Board.33  Logically, then, a
MAPA agency is a state entity that the state legislature or the state constitu-
tion authorizes to make rules,34 determine contested cases,35 or enter into
contracts,36 unless otherwise specifically exempted.  Thus, the question
then is what constitutes those activities.
29. Id. at § 2–4–102(2)(a)(i)–(v).  This group of exemptions is referenced as MAPA exceptions to
the definition of an “agency” in MAPA itself.
30. Id. at § 2–4–102(2)(b).
31. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–3–102(1) (emphasis added); see Mont. Atty. Gen. Op. 46–1, 1995 WL
111234 (Feb. 23, 1995).  The Board of Directors of the Montana self-insurers guaranty fund is a MAPA
agency because it is a public organization with a public purpose and because it has statutory authority to
adopt public rules and enter into public contracts.
32. See e.g. Mont. Socy. of Anesthesiologists v. Mont. Bd. of Nursing, 171 P.3d 704, 713 (Mont.
2007) (administrative agencies have only those powers specifically conferred upon them by the legisla-
ture); Bradco Supply Co. v. Larsen, 598 P.2d 596, 598 (Mont. 1979) (MAPA does not confer authority
on an agency to adopt rules); Fallon Co. v. State, 223 P.3d 886, 890 (Mont. 2009); Mont. Code Ann.
§ 2–4–301 (“Except [for the MAPA authority given to the secretary of state and the attorney general to
adopt a set of uniform model rules], nothing in this [Act] confers authority upon or augments the author-
ity of any state agency to adopt, administer, or enforce any rule.”).
33. Mont. Const. art. X, § 4.  While the Montana Constitution creates and authorizes the State
Lands Board, the Constitution also states that the Board’s authority is in large part dependent on state
legislative action—the Board may act “under such regulations and restrictions as may be provided by
law.” Id.
34. See e.g. Mont. Code Ann. § 30–10–1008 (authorizing the Montana Securities Commissioner to
“adopt rules regarding the department’s [particular] processes”).
35. See e.g. id. at § 9–31–406 (authorizing the Montana Board of Personnel Appeals decide unfair
labor practice complaints in public sector union-management disputes).
36. See e.g. id. at §§ 60–4–102 to 60–4–103 (authorizing Department of Transportation or acquire
land for highway purposes).
5
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1. Authorization for an Agency to Enter into Contracts
Many Montana state agencies fit the bill.  The State Land Board37 and
the Montana Highway Department38 are obvious examples, but many lesser
known entities are also so authorized.39
2. Authorization for an Agency to Make Rules and Determine Contested
Cases
The MAPA defines both “rules”40 and “contested cases.”41  Those def-
initions provide a means of distinguishing between these two administrative
actions.  However, the MAPA definitions tend to distinguish rules from
contested cases only if the reader already knows the salient differences.
Consequently, closer analysis is required.
a. Authority to Make Rules
The MAPA defines a “rule” as “each agency regulation, standard, or
statement of general applicability that implements, interprets, or prescribes
law or policy or describes the organization, procedures, or practice require-
ments of an agency . . . [including] the amendment or repeal of a prior
rule.”42  Notably, this definition is almost identical to that of the Model
37. The State Land Board is authorized to “direct, control, lease, exchange and sell school lands . . .
under such regulations and ratifications as may be provided by law.  Mont. Const. art X, § 4.
38. The Montana Highway Department is authorized to “acquire by purchase . . . lands or other real
property . . . reasonably necessary for present or future highway purposes.”  Mont. Code Ann.
§ 60–4–102.
39. E.g. the Montana Board of Horseracing is authorized to “hire racing officials,” incur costs,
charges, and expenses, and enter into contracts for simulcast races. See Mont. Code Ann.
§§ 23–4–201(6), 23–4–102(2).
40. Id. at § 2–4–102(11)(2).
41. Id. at § 2–4–102(4).
42. Id. at § 2–4–102(11)(a) (emphasis added).  The definition specifically excludes:
(i) statements concerning only the internal management of an agency or state government
and not affecting private rights or procedures available to the public, including rules
implementing the state personnel classification plan, the state wage and salary plan, or
the statewide accounting, budgeting and human resource system;
(ii) formal opinions of the attorney general and declaratory rulings issued pursuant to
2–4–501;
(iii) rules relating to the use of public works, facilities, streets, and highways when the sub-
stance of the rule is indicated to the public by means of signs or signals;
(iv) seasonal rules adopted annually or biennially relating to hunting, fishing, and trapping
when there is a statutory requirement for the publication of the rules and rules adopted
annually or biennially relating to the seasonal recreational use of lands and waters owned
or controlled by the state when the substance of the rules is indicated to the public by
means of signs or signals; or
(v) uniform rules adopted pursuant to interstate compact, except that the rules must be filed
in accordance with 2–4–306 and must be published in ARM.
6
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Act43 and the federal APA.44
The operative phrase of this definition is “statement of general applica-
bility.”  Agency rulemaking involves the agency’s prospective45 interpreta-
tion of its authorizing or enabling statute—the legislature’s grant of author-
ity to the agency—in the form of substantive or procedural statements ap-
plicable to all, or to a specific class of persons or entities,46 within its
jurisdiction.  These prospective statements are often referred to as “quasi-
legislative” agency actions because, when engaged in rulemaking, the
agency acts much like a legislative body—articulating prospective stan-
dards of general applicability to all persons or to a specific class of persons.
When such rule statements are consistent with the agency’s authoriz-
ing legislation and legislative intent, the rule effectively becomes an exten-
sion of the legislation and is enforceable to the same extent as if the legisla-
ture had included the rule language in the statute itself.47  An illustration is
helpful.  If an environmental agency with the legislative authority to make
rules establishes a specific permissible emission rate, that rule carries the
full force and effect of law as long as it is consistent with legislative intent.
The resulting emission rate rule is prospective and applicable only to enti-
ties within the agency’s jurisdiction, or a specified class of such entities.
Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–102(11)(b)(i)–(v).
43. Model St. Admin. P. Act § 1 (Natl. Conf. Commrs. Unif. St. Laws 1961).
44. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2006).
45. A well-accepted way to identify agency rules (quasi-legislative) decisions is that they, like
legislative action itself, are prospective standards that apply to all persons or an acceptably defined class
of persons.  The MAPA definition of a rule incorporates the second concept—applying to all persons or
an acceptably defined class of persons—by using the language “statement of general applicability.”  The
first concept, that rules are “prospective” is also well-accepted. Compare Bowen v. Georgetown U.
Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (agency rules do not apply retroactively) with West-Mont Community
Care, Inc. v. Bd. of Health & Envtl. Sci., 703 P.2d 850, 852 (Mont. 1985) (quoting Castles v. State ex
rel. Mont. Dept. of Highways, 609 P.2d 1223, 1225 (Mont. 1980)) (retro application of an agency rule is
impermissible only if it “takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws or creates new
obligations or poses new duties in respect to transactions already past.”); accord Brockie v. Omo Con-
str., Inc., 887 P.2d 167, 171 (Mont. 1994).
46. A rule may be of general applicability even if it is of immediate concern only to a single person
or small group, provided that the form of the rule is general and others who fall within the regulated
category in the future will come within its coverage. See e.g. Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelhaus, 482 F.2d
1301 (10th Cir. 1973).
47. See Bick v. Mont. Dept. of Just., Div. of Motor Veh., 730 P.2d 418, 420–421 (Mont. 1986)
(citing Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–305(6) (1985) to establish that no rule is valid unless consistent and not
in conflict with the statute).
7
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Agency rulemaking does not trigger constitutional due process.48
MAPA,49 the Public Participation Act,50 the Model Act,51 and the APA52
all provide the public the right of notice and participation, but those are
statutory, not constitutional mandates.  Constitutional due process notice
and hearing rights are not triggered by agency rulemaking.53  Indeed, the
basic distinction between quasi-legislative processes, like rulemaking, and
quasi-judicial processes, like contested cases, is that, constitutionally, the
former requires no notice and hearing, whereas the latter requires both no-
tice and hearing.
b. Authority to Decide Contested Cases
When an agency is not acting like a legislative body (promulgating
standards of “general applicability” for the future), but rather acting like a
civil or criminal court (adjudicating past fact, and/or interpreting and apply-
ing law to fact based on a closed54 hearing record) the agency is acting
quasi-judicially.55  Like the judicial counterpart, an administrative agency is
required to comply with constitutional due process if the agency proceeding
could result in a taking of liberty and/or property.56
48. See Minn. St. Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 283–287 (1984) (citing Bi-
Metallic Inv. Co. v. Colo., 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1991) for the proposition that agency quasi-legislative
determinations are not subject to Constitutional due process); Bowen, 488 U.S. at 208 (unlike the author-
ity of Congress to make a statute retroactive, administrative agency rules only operate prospectively);
but see West-Mont Community Care Inc., 703 P.2d at 852 (in a case decided only one year after Bowen,
the Montana Supreme Court, not citing Bowen, held that agency rules apply retroactively).
49. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–302.
50. Id. at § 2–3–111.
51. Model State Adm. Procedure Act § 3–103 to 104.
52. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c).
53. Knight, 465 U.S. at 283–287 (1984) (citing Bi-Metallic Investment Co, 239 U.S. at 445).
54. A judicial (criminal or civil) hearing is a “closed” hearing.  Finding of facts are to be made
based only on evidence presented or disclosed during the hearing and the opposing party is afforded the
opportunity to rebut.
55. The Compiler’s Comments for MAPA uses the term “trial-type” as a means of generally
describing the hearing procedures and process of a contested case hearing.
56. Like its judicial counterpart, if the result of such an administrative proceeding will result in a
taking of liberty or property (administrative agencies may take only liberty or property), constitutional
due process is triggered, and normally the party would be entitled to a hearing that satisfies due process.
There are situations where there is no right to an administrative hearing even though the matter in
controversy involves quasi-judicial rather than quasi-legislative fact determinations.  These situations
involve determinations of fact by (1) inspections, (2) tests, and (3) elections.  The APA specifically
exempts situations involving fact determinations by these processes from hearing requirements.  5
U.S.C. § 554(a)(3) (specifically exempting inspections, tests, and elections from hearing requirements).
Indeed, constitutional due process may be satisfied in the absence of an administrative hearing when fact
determinations are appropriately made by these methods. Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Norwalk, 425
A.2d 576, 581 (Conn. 1979) (when administrative quasi-judicial fact-finding “requires technical or pro-
fessional expertise,” then that fact-finding “may appropriately depend upon inspections, examinations or
testing rather than upon an adversary hearing”).  For example, the most appropriate method for an ad-
8
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Under the MAPA, if the agency is acting quasi-judicially, and hearing
is required “by law” (by statute, constitutional due process, or possibly
common law)57 the proceeding is a “contested case.”
The Attorney General’s Model Rules explain that a contested case in-
volves “an agency determination that affects the rights or responsibilities of
a specifically named party.”58  A contested case, unlike prospective
rulemaking, involves an inquiry as to past facts.  Contested cases include a
finding of fact, a determination of the applicable law, application of that
law to facts, and a judgment.
Based on the above analysis, it is generally fairly simple to distinguish
between a MAPA rulemaking and a contested case proceeding.59   How-
ever, the following two Montana cases demonstrate when the distinction is
less clear.
In Johansen v. State,60 the respondent, the Department of Natural Re-
sources and Conservation, leased agricultural land to petitioner Johansen.
Johansen failed to pay the rent on the land, and the Department cancelled
the lease.  A Department representative met with Johansen, but the Depart-
ment alleged that this meeting did not constitute a “contested case” pro-
ceeding.  The Department also argued that no “contested case” hearing was
required by statute or constitutional due process prior to the cancellation of
the lease.  Johansen alleged that he had properly mailed the rent check to
the Department, and argued that such a fact dispute had to be resolved via a
contested case proceeding.61
ministrative agency to determine whether a particular cut of meat is prime or choice is to grant a hearing
or have a qualified inspector perform an inspection.  Similarly, the most appropriate method for a gov-
ernmental entity to determine the qualification of an applicant to receive a barber’s license is through a
hearing or a test, or, perhaps even more appropriate, graduation from a state licensed school.  Finally,
when the issue before the agency is whether a majority of employees want a particular union to re-
present them in collective bargaining with their employer, the best method is to hold an evidentiary
hearing or conduct an election. Nye v. Dept. of Livestock, 639 P.2d 498, 501 (Mont. 1982) (citing Mont.
Code Ann. tit. 2 ch. 4 (compiler’s comments)) (a hearing is “required by law” if a hearing is required by
(1) the agency-enabling/authorizing legislation, or (2) constitutional due process); see also Johansen v.
State, 955 P.2d 653, 658 (Mont. 1998).
57. McCrory, supra n. 2 at 51–52 (the definition of contested case is “broadly phrased to include all
proceedings in which the basic concepts of due process should be applied to protect private rights and
the public interest”).
58. Admin. R. Mont. § 1.3.211 (2011).
59. Pierce, Jr., supra n. 10, at 302–303; 5 U.S.C.A. § 551(5), (7) (West 2011).  For those familiar
with federal agency practice under the APA, quasi-judicial proceedings are called adjudications.  Under
the APA, adjudication may be formal or informal.  If a specific agency-authorizing or enabling statute
directs that an adjudicatory hearing be “on the record,” the APA directs that the hearing conform to a
formal trial-type process.  Indeed, even if a specific agency-authorizing or enabling statute does not
require that an adjudicatory hearing be “on the record,” but congressional intent for a formal hearing is
otherwise expressed or judicially determined, the hearing is to be a formal trial-type hearing.
60. Johansen, 955 P.2d 653.
61. Id. at 655–657.
9
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Certainly, the cancelling of the lease was a quasi-judicial determina-
tion—a decision unique to Johansen based on his individual facts and cir-
cumstances (whether he had properly mailed the rent check)—but the Mon-
tana Supreme Court concluded that a contested case hearing, on the ques-
tion of fact, was not required before the cancellation.  The Court said that
state statutory law authorized the Department to terminate the lease for fail-
ure to pay the rent and that the statute did not require the Department to
hold a “hearing” before doing so.  Indeed, statutory law did not require any
hearing, either before or after the cancellation.62
Having lost the argument for “hearing” required by statute, Johansen
then argued that a “hearing” was required by constitutional due process.
The Court disagreed and said that if due process required a hearing,63 then a
MAPA contested case hearing was required.  But, the Court said Johansen
cited no legal authority or analysis for the proposition that he had been
deprived of liberty or property without due process, and that it was not the
Court’s “job to conduct legal research on his behalf, to guess as to his pre-
cise position, or to develop legal analysis that may lend support to that
position.”64  Thus, because no hearing was “required by law,” (by statute or
constitutional provision) Johansen was not entitled to a MAPA trial-type,
contested case hearing before the termination of the lease.  Of course, the
agency made a finding of fact, i.e., that Johansen did not make a timely rent
payment, but the prerequisite for that finding was not a contested case hear-
ing, the finding was instead based on agency information obtained infor-
mally from Johansen and agency staff.
In Dupuis v. Board of Trustees, Ronan School District No. 30,65 the
Polson School District Board of Trustees held a public hearing (where
members of the public were invited to comment) on whether to continue to
use the “Chief” and “Maiden” mascots and retain the use of certain Native
American symbols on the gymnasium floor.  At the conclusion of the hear-
ing, the Board decided that it would not change its policy permitting such
uses.66   The school board’s process was much like a legislative hearing to
determine the need for legislation, in that the school board was seeking
public comment on a matter of community interest.
The petitioner, an American Indian, appealed the school board’s deci-
sion to the county superintendent of schools.  The county superintendent
accepted jurisdiction of the matter despite the school district’s challenge of
62. Id. at 658.
63. The action of the Department, cancellation of the lease, was quasi-judicial and a persuasive
argument could be made that the lease cancellation resulted in a “taking” of property (the leasehold).
64. Johansen, 955 P.2d at 658.
65. Dupuis v. Bd. of Trustees, Ronan Sch. Dist. No. 30, 128 P.3d 1010 (Mont. 2006).
66. Id. at 1011.
10
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his power to do so, and the school district appealed the superintendent’s
acceptance of jurisdiction to the Montana State Superintendent of Public
Instruction.67
By Montana statute, a county superintendent has appellate jurisdiction
over a school board decision only if the decision was made after a “con-
tested case” hearing.68  The State Superintendent concluded that the county
superintendent had no jurisdiction.  That order was affirmed by state district
court and the Montana Supreme Court.69
The Dupuis Court’s decision was grounded in the fact that the school
board’s decision was not the product of a contested case hearing.70  It rea-
soned that a mere disagreement with a school district does not automatically
entitle an aggrieved party to a contested case hearing to resolve the disa-
greement, and that the hearing was quasi-legislative in nature and only an
effort by the board to receive public comment.71  Because the jurisdiction of
the county superintendent is limited to contested cases and the board hear-
ing was quasi-legislative, the county superintendent had no appellate juris-
diction.72
Johansen and Dupuis illustrate the basic distinction between quasi-ju-
dicial matters and quasi-legislative matters.  Quasi-legislative hearings are
for the purpose of establishing prospective standards for everyone within
the agency’s jurisdiction, or an appropriate subgroup, whereas, quasi-judi-
cial decisions are intended to adjudicate past-fact, like a court case.  They
also illustrate that for a quasi-judicial matter to rise to the status of a con-
tested case, a fact-finding hearing must be required by statutory law, consti-
tutional due process, or possibly common law.  The fact that an agency
makes an important decision relative to a petitioner does not necessarily
mean that the agency must conduct a contested case hearing.  In addition,
nor does the fact that the agency conducts a legislative-type hearing, mean
that the hearing is a contested case hearing.
67. Because MAPA only applies to agencies of the state government (not to agencies of subdivi-
sions of the state, such as counties, municipalities, transportation/school/irrigation districts, it was not
until this matter reached the State Superintendent of Public Instruction that MAPA was even applicable.
See  Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–102(2).
68. Dupuis, 128 P.3d at 1011–1012.
69. Id. at 1012.  The Court concluded that the petitioner may have a remedy concerning her consti-
tutional claims, but such claims must be brought before the Montana Human Rights Commission. Id. at
1013–1014.
70. Id. at 1013.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1012.
11
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III. THE MAPA’S RULE AND CONTESTED CASE PROCEDURES
The next two parts of this article discuss rulemaking procedures and
contested case procedures.  The discussion is, for the most part, based on
two applicable portions of the MAPA.  In addition to its specific procedural
provisions, the MAPA directs the Montana Secretary of State, with respect
to rules, and the Montana Attorney General, with respect to rules and con-
tested cases, to prepare model rules and practice forms to assist state agen-
cies, law practitioners, and the public in understanding the dictates of the
Act.73  Because the Secretary of State publishes state agency administrative
rules, that office is required to publish model rules and forms regarding
state agency rules.  The Attorney General is responsible for compiling
model rules and forms on contested case and declaratory judgment proce-
dures.  The model rules and forms may be accessed at the respective offi-
cial’s website.74  The rulemaking and contested case procedures portions of
the article cite the MAPA, as well as model rules, forms and templates.
A. The MAPA’s Rulemaking Procedure
As discussed above, MAPA agency rulemaking is a quasi-legislative
process in which the agency formulates a “regulation, standard, or state-
ment of general applicability that implements, interprets, or prescribes law
or policy” (substantive or procedural) including the “amendment or repeal
of a prior rule.”75  Because the MAPA agency rulemaking procedure is not
applicable to all agency rules, it is important to recognize the various types
of MAPA rules.  Additionally, before considering the specifics of MAPA
rulemaking, it is important to note that if the Legislature included specific
rulemaking procedures in the enabling or authorizing legislation of a partic-
ular agency, those procedures prevail over the generic MAPA rulemaking
procedures.76
73. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–202(1); McCrory, supra n. 2, at 31–40.
74. Mont. Sec. of State, ARM Templates, http://www.armtemplates.com (accessed June 22, 2012).
75. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–102(11)(a) (emphasis added); see also Admin. R. Mont. § 1.3.307
(exceptions to the definition of a rule should be construed narrowly); Vainio, 35 P.3d at 953 (an admin-
istrative policy does not have the full force and effect of law absent the agency proceeding with and
complying with rulemaking); N.W. Airlines, Inc. v. State Tax App. Bd., 720 P.2d 676, 678 (Mont. 1986)
(an administrative decision by an agency employee qualified as a rule, and to be valid, the agency was
required to engage in and complete a rulemaking procedure).
76. See Pickens v. Shelton-Thompson, 3 P.3d 603, 606 (Mont. 2000); see also Schneeman v. Dept.
of Lab. & Indus., 848 P.2d 504, 506 (Mont. 1993), overruled on other grounds, Slater v. Empl. Sec. Div.
of Dept. of Lab. & Indus., 676 P.2d 220, 222 (Mont. 1984).
12
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1. Types of MAPA Rules
The MAPA defines “substantive” agency rules as: legislative and ad-
jective/procedural.  Legislative rulemaking authority must be expressly au-
thorized by the Legislature.77  To engage in legislative rulemaking, an
agency must have express rulemaking authority delegated to it by the Legis-
lature.78  This authority is conferred by the agency’s enabling or authorizing
legislation; the MAPA itself does not confer upon agencies rulemaking au-
thority.79
To determine whether a particular agency has this authority, “one must
look at the statute creating [the agency].”80  This legislative authority may
be stated in a variety of ways, but the grant must be clear, specific, and
express.  If the agency has been provided with such legislative authority,
has procedurally complied with the MAPA rulemaking requirements,81 and
has properly implemented or interpreted its legislative authority,82 the
agency’s rule has the full force and effect of law.83  Courts determine
whether an agency rule is consistent with legislative intent by comparing
the rule with the intent of the legislature.84
77. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–102 (13)(a); see also generally  In re DNRC, 740 P.2d 1096 (Mont.
1987); Admin. R. Mont. § 1.3.307(3); Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–102(13)(a) (“legislative rules, which if
adopted in accordance with this chapter and under expressly delegated authority to promulgate rules to
implement a statute have the force of law and when not so adopted are invalid”); see Mont. Atty. Gen.
Op. 35–8 (Feb. 8, 1973) (a state plan prepared by an MAPA agency pursuant to federal law is a rule and
must be adopted consistent with MAPA rulemaking procedure).
78. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–305(3); see also Mont. Socy. of Anesthesiologists, 171 P.3d at 713
(agencies have legislative rulemaking authority only if specifically conferred by the legislature); Fallon
Co., 223 P.3d at 888; id. at 891–892 (Rice, J., dissenting) (citing Darby Spar, Ltd. v. Dept. of Revenue,
705 P.2d 111, 113 (Mont. 1985) for the proposition that legislative inaction was indicative of intent).
79. Bradco Supply Co., 598 P.2d at 598 (“MAPA alone does not confer authority to adopt rules.
The MAPA merely outlines the correct procedure an agency must use once the agency has been granted
statutory power to adopt rules.”).
80. Id.
81. Rosebud Co. v. Dept. of Revenue, 849 P.2d 177, 180 (Mont. 1993) (agency rule was invalid for
failure to follow proper rulemaking procedure).
82. See State ex rel. Swart v. Casne, 564 P.2d 983, 986 (Mont. 1977), overruled on other grounds,
Trustees of Ind. U. v. Buxbaum, 69 P.3d 663 (Mont, 2003); see also Garsjo v. Dept. of Lab. & Indus.,
562 P.2d 473, 475 (Mont. 1977) (administrative rules must be consistent and not conflict with an
agency’s authorizing or enabling legislative directive).
83. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–506(1) (a rule may be declared invalid if it is found that impairs with
the legal rights of the plaintiff).
84. Mont. Dept. of Revenue v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 830 P.2d 1259, 1264 (Mont. 1992) (agency
rule that conflicts with authorizing or enabling legislation is invalid); Bd. of Barbers v. Big Sky College
of Barber-Styling, Inc., 626 P.2d 1269, 1271 (Mont. 1981) (an agency rule that is more stringent than
statute is invalid); accord Taylor v. Taylor, 899 P.2d 523, 526 (Mont. 1995) (an administrative rule that
is more stringent than statute is invalid); Michels v. Dept. of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 609 P.2d 271, 273
(Mont. 1980) (a rule in conflict with the statute from which it derives is without effect; a statute cannot
be changed by administrative rule; a rule may not engraft additional requirements on a statute that were
not envisioned by the legislature).
13
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Alternatively, an adjective or interpretive rule is either an agency inter-
pretative statement, made under express legislative authority but absent the
MAPA procedural rulemaking requirements, or made under implied legisla-
tive authority, even if made in accord with MAPA rulemaking require-
ments.85  Adjective or interpretative rules do not have the full force and
effect of law, but if they are consistent with legislative intent, they may be
persuasive to a court on judicial review.86
The third type of agency rules are statements describing the agency’s
organization and procedures.87  MAPA procedural notice and hearing re-
quirements do not apply to these rules.88  A fourth and fifth type of agency
rules, emergency and temporary rules, are also not subject to the MAPA
procedural requirements for a rulemaking.  Emergency rules address an im-
minent peril to public health, safety, or welfare.89  Temporary rules imple-
ment a statute or statutory amendment that becomes effective prior to Octo-
ber 1 of a given year and is effective only until October 1 of the year of
adoption.90  These rules have the full force and effect of law.
2. MAPA Rulemaking Procedure
Generally, rulemaking procedures will include an agency notice to the
public of the proposed rule—either publication of the proposed rule itself,
or publication of at least sufficient information about the proposed rule for
the public to be able to take an informed position—and the opportunity for
the public to comment on the agency proposal.  This notice and comment
procedure is at the heart of all rulemaking, whether provided in the specific
85. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–102(13)(b); Admin. R. Mont. § 1.3.307(2) (“Interpretive rules are
statements issued by an agency to advise the public of the agency’s construction of the statutes and rules
which it administers.”).
86. See Mont. Atty. Gen Op. 39–18 (June 4, 1981) (MAPA agency was given statutory authority to
adopt interpretative rules, such rules do not have the force of law, and a reviewing court may give the
rules that legal authority if persuaded that the rules are consistent with legislative intent, but may substi-
tute its judgment for that of the agency). See also Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65
(1986) (while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, agency guidelines or interpre-
tations, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may
property resort for guidance).
87. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–201.
88. Id. at § 2–4–201(1); see also Admin. R. Mont. § 1.3.305(1).
89. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–303(1)(a).  But, an agency engaged in emergency rulemaking must file
a notice with the appropriate legislative administrative rule review committee. Id.; see also Admin. R.
Mont. § 1.3.313(1)(a)(ii);  Admin. R. Mont. Templates 313a, 313b.  For examples of emergency rules,
see State ex rel. Dept. of Soc. & Rehab. Serv. v. Cole, 538 P.2d 1031, 1032 (Mont. 1975) (the failure of
the legislature to fully fund the agency, requiring it to make adjustments such as cutting programs, to
live within its budget, justified agency emergency rulemaking); but see Mont. Atty. Gen. Op. 42–62
(Feb. 5, 1988) (while an emergency situation is reason to engage in emergency rulemaking, the agency
should rely on regular MAPA where it could foresee a coming problem).
90. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–303(2); see also Admin. R. Mont. Templates 313c, 313d.
14
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agency’s enabling or authorizing legislation or in the MAPA.  For those
familiar with federal agency notice and comment rulemaking, MAPA
rulemaking is much the same.  Indeed, even apart from MAPA and the spe-
cific requirements that may be included in an agency’s specific enabling or
authorizing legislation, the Montana Public Participation Act91 and the
Montana Constitution92 require agency notice93 and the opportunity for
public participation and comment.94  In the context of MAPA rulemaking,
the MAPA procedure fulfills the Montana constitutional and Public Partici-
pation Act mandates for citizen participation.95  The next two subsections
concern the specific MAPA requirements for Notice and Comment
rulemaking.
i. Notice
The MAPA includes various notice requirements for administrative
rulemaking.96  The first notice is to the state legislator who was the “pri-
mary bill sponsor” of the agency’s authorizing or enabling legislation.  That
notice must be given when the agency first begins to work on the substan-
tive content and wording of the proposed rule.97  The purpose of contacting
the primary bill sponsor is to obtain his or her comments, inform the legis-
lator of the known dates of each step of the rulemaking process, and to
notify the legislator of times for commenting on the proposed rules.98
The next step in the rulemaking process is for the agency to draft the
proposed rule.  Because the standards for statutory construction are also ap-
91. Mont. Code Ann. tit. 2, ch. 3.  The Act, based on Mont. Const. art. II, § 8 (right of participa-
tion), requires all agencies of the state and local government to provide notice to the public and public
participation in all “agency decisions that are of significant interest to the public,” not including con-
tested cases or other agency adjudications.  Mont. Code Ann. § 2–3–103(1)(a)–(b).
92. Mont. Const. art. II, § 8.
93. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 2–3–104 to 2–3–107 (notice provisions).
94. Id. at § 2–3–111 (implementing the Montana constitutional right of citizen participation in gov-
ernment).
95. Mont. Atty. Gen. Op. 38–69 (Feb. 28, 1980).
96. Admin. R. Mont. §§ 1.3.307(4)(b), 1.3.309; Admin. R. Mont. Templates 309a.
97. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–302(2)(d)(i) (actual attempt to contact the primary bill sponsor is re-
quired).  The statute provides: When an agency begins to work on the substantive content and the word-
ing of a proposal notice for a rule that initially implements legislation, the agency shall contact, as
provided in subsection (8), the legislator who was the primary sponsor of the legislation to:
(A) obtain the legislator’s comments;
(B) inform the legislator of the known dates by which each step of the rulemaking process
must be completed; and
(C) provide the legislator with information about the time periods during which the legislator
may comment on the proposed rules, including the opportunity to provide comment to the
appropriate administrative rule review committee. Id.
98. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–302(2)(d)(i).
15
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plicable to the interpretation of administrative rules,99 agency rule drafters
must be knowledgeable of these standards.100  Other than the standards of
statutory construction and the few specific standards referenced in the
MAPA,101 rule drafters are generally free to draft with the knowledge that
resulting rules will be interpreted according to their plain language.102
Once the proposed rule is drafted, the agency must give notice to the
public and specific entities and individuals of its proposal.  The notice must
provide:
• the substance of the intended action or description of the subjects and is-
sues involved;103
• citations to the specific authorizing or enabling legislation granting the
agency rulemaking authority; and;104
• citations to the specific statutes the agency rule(s) will address;105
• a description of any policy of a governing board or commission being
implemented;106
• a statement of reasonable necessity for the rule;107
• confirmation that the legislative bill sponsor has been contacted;108
• specific notice regarding monetary amounts to be paid or received;109
• an explanation of how a person or group with a special or continuing inter-
est in a subject may be placed on the list of interested persons who in the
future will receive actual notice of rulemakings;110
99. State v. Frickey, 136 P.3d 558, 562 (Mont. 2006).
100. See generally Bill Drafting Manual 2010 (Mont. Legis. Servs. Div. 2010) (available at http://
leg.mt.gov/content/Publications/2010-bill-drafting-manual.pdf) (manual published biennially for each
legislative session by the Legislative Services Division).
101. The specific rule drafting standards in the MAPA provide that rules may not unnecessarily
repeat statutory language, and statutory language that is repeated must be identified as such.  Mont.
Code Ann. § 2–4–305(2).  Also, a rule may adopt by reference any model code, federal regulation, or
other agency rule, “if publication of the full language would be unduly cumbersome.” Id. at
§ 2–4–307(1)(a)–(b).
102. See e.g. Tuttle v. Dept. of Just., 167 P.3d 864, 867 (Mont. 2007).
103. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–302(1)(a).
104. Id. at § 2–4–305(3).
105. Id.
106. Id. at § 2–4–305(4).
107. Id. at § 2–4–305(6)(b).  The operative question is why the agency believes the rulemaking
necessary, and “a statement that merely explains what the rule provides is not a statement of the reasona-
ble necessity of the rule.” Id.  Compare Bd. of Barbers, 626 P.2d at 1270 (a rule must be reasonably
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the statute) with Mont. Socy. of Anesthesiologists, 171 P.3d at 715
(even though the agency did not fully comply with the requirement for a statement of necessity, the
public was placed on sufficient notice to effectively participate in the rulemaking).
108. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–302(1)(b).
109. Id. at § 2–4–302(1)(c)(i)–(ii) (proposals to adopt, increase, or decrease a fee or other monetary
amount a person shall pay or will receive must include the estimate, if known, of the cumulative amount
for all persons of the proposed increase, decrease, or new amount, and the estimated number of persons
affected).
110. Id. at § 2–4–302(2)(a)(iii).
16
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• notice of a public hearing if a public hearing will be held, and if a public
hearing is not planned, the notice must state the legal basis that would
compel such a hearing;111 and
• notice of the opportunity to submit written comments on the agency rule
proposal.112
The Montana Secretary of State has published rule templates containing
these requirements.113
The public notice must be published in the Montana Administrative
Register114 and in any state electronic access system or other electronic
communications system available to the public.115  Actual notice is to be
given to those listed on the agency’s “interested persons list” and to any
professional trade or industrial group or member who has filed a request
with the appropriate legislative administrative rule review committee,116
and the legislative primary bill sponsor.117  Also, a specific agency statute
may require actual notice to an advisory council.
An agency may use an amended notice to correct deficiencies in cita-
tions of authority, statutes implemented, or to amend the statement of rea-
sonable necessity.118  If such an amendment alters the statement of reasona-
ble necessity, the agency must allow additional time for oral or written
comments.119  Generally, an agency must complete its rulemaking action on
the matter specified in the original notice no later than six months from the
date of the notice.120  If the administrative rule review committee for the
agency gives a written objection to a proposed notice, the agency is re-
stricted in adopting a final rule.121  Every MAPA agency is to appoint a
“qualified person” to assure all notices are properly made.122
111. Id. at § 2–4–302(4).
112. Id.
113. See Admin. R. Mont. Templates 309(a)–(c).
114. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 2–4–302(2)(a)(i), 2–4–306(1), and 2–4–312(1).  For those familiar with
the Federal Register, the Montana Register is similar, except for its frequency of publication.
115. Id. at § 2–4–302(2)(c).
116. Id. at § 2–4–302(2)(a)(i).
117. Id. at § 2–4–302(2)(d)(i).
118. Id. at § 2–4–305(8)(a); see also Admin. R. Mont. Templates 309d.
119. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–305(8)(c); see also Admin. R. Mont. Templates 309e.
120. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–302(3).  Failure to complete the rulemaking within the six months
invalidates the proposed notice and requires the agency to start anew. Id. at § 2–4–302(6).  Unless,
within the six months, the agency publishes an amended or supplemental notice. Id. at § 2–4–305(7).
121. Id. at. § 2–4–305(9).
122. Id. at § 2–4–110(1).
17
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ii. Possibility of a Public Hearing
A MAPA agency is required to hold an oral rulemaking hearing if the
proposed rule involves a matter of “significant interest to the public”123 or
such a hearing is otherwise required by law.  The agency must also hold a
hearing at the request of any of the following four groups: (a) the lesser of
10 percent or 25 of the people who will be directly affected by the agency
proposal, (b) “a governmental subdivision or agency,” (c) the appropriate
legislative rule committee, or (d) “an association having [at least] 25 mem-
bers who will be directly affected.”124  If a hearing is to be held, the agency
must by notice125 set a date, time, and place.126  The MAPA provides that
the hearing is legislative in type.127  If no public hearing is held, public
comment is made in writing and is addressed only to the agency.128
iii. Agency Consideration of Comments and Final Adoption
Once the agency has gathered comments, oral and written, it must fully
consider them before drafting a final rule.129  If an agency adopts a rule that
is inconsistent with some comments, the adoption notice must include the
agency’s rationale for doing so.130 Additionally, the agency must justify any
substantial differences between the rule as proposed and as adopted.131
Failure to fully consider public comments and to state the principal reasons
for not adopting an approach presented will invalidate the rule.132  The final
rule adoption notice must be published within six months of the publication
of the proposed rulemaking notice133 and must contain an order of such
adoption.134  The final rule is considered adopted as of the date it is filed
123. Id. at § 2–4–302(4).  A matter of “significant interest to the public” means agency actions
“[known] to be of widespread citizen interest . . . . [including] issues involving substantial fiscal impact
to or controversy involving a particular class or group of individuals.”  Mont. Code Ann.
§ 2–4–102(12).
124. Id. at § 2–4–302(4).
125. Id.
126. Id. at § 2–4–302(1)(a).  A hearing date may be continued for cause. Id. at § 2–4–302(5).
127. The purpose of the hearing is to allow the public to provide information, comment, and argu-
ment on the rule proposal.  The formal trial-type contested case procedures need not be followed. Id. at
§ 2–4–302(5).  The presiding officer is required to read or summarize the rule proposal from the notice,
read the “Notice of Function of Administrative Rule Review Committee,” and inform those at the hear-
ing of the right to have their names placed on the agency’s interested person list (if on the list, in future
rulemakings the person would be given actual notice).  Admin. R. Mont. § 1.3.311(2)(c).
128. See Admin. R. Mont. Templates 309b (notice when no public hearing is contemplated).
129. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–305(1)(a).
130. Id. at § 2–4–305(1)(b)(ii).
131. Id. at § 2–4–305(1)(b)(i); see also Admin. R. Mont. Templates 312a–312c, 312g.
132. Patterson v. Dept. of Revenue, 557 P.2d 798, 805 (Mont. 1976).
133. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–305(7) (if the agency amends the proposed rule notice, the six months
is determined from the date of the last notice).
134. Admin. R. Mont. § 1.3.312(2)(a)(iv); see also Admin. R. Mont. Templates 312g.
18
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with the Secretary of State,135 and it generally becomes effective the day
after publication in the Administrative Register.136
If the agency decides not to adopt a final rule, no notice is required,137
but the agency may publish a notice stating its intent.138  Once the adoption
notice is published, the agency may correct technical or clerical errors.139
In addition to the above rulemaking requirements, each agency must,
at least biennially, review its rules to determine whether any new rule
should be adopted or any existing rule should be modified or repealed.140
Finally, while the agency usually initiates rulemaking, a person may also
petition an agency for the adoption, amendment, or repeal of a rule.141
3. Legislative Review of Rules and Agency Economic Impact Statements
Often in the discussion of administrative law little is said of the contin-
uing role that the legislature plays in guiding the operation of an agency.
Legislative committees conduct oversight hearings to review agency opera-
tions and decision making.  Through the appropriation process, the legisla-
ture controls the amount of money an agency receives, and may direct
agency dollars into and away from certain agency activities.  The MAPA
does not address the above activities, but it addresses and provides for legis-
lative action regarding agency rulemaking and requires economic impact
statements for proposed agency rules.
i. Legislative Review of Rules
The Montana Legislature, like Congress, divides legislative subjects
into specific legislative committees.142  The MAPA provides legislative
committees with jurisdiction to review agency-proposed rules.143  The
MAPA also allows legislative committees to make written recommenda-
tions to the agency regarding the adoption, amendment, or rejection of such
135. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–306(1).
136. For exceptions, see Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–306(4).
137. Id. at § 2–4–305(7) (if notice is not given, the rule proposal becomes invalid after six months).
138. Admin. R. Mont. § 1.3.312(5).
139. See Admin. R. Mont. Templates 312f.
140. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–314.
141. Id. at § 2–4–315 (the agency is required to either deny the petition in writing or initiate
rulemaking within 60 days, no hearing is required); Com. Cause of Mont. v. Argenbright, 917 P.2d 425,
429 (Mont. 1996) (holding that an agency has discretion to deny a petition for adoption of a particular
rule but not to summarily deny a petition seeking to invoke an agency’s “obligation to engage in
mandatory rulemaking”) (emphasis in original); Admin. R. Mont. § 1.3.308; Admin. R. Mont. Tem-
plates 308(a).
142. The appropriate legislative committee is determined by both the legislature’s rules and Montana
statute. See Mont. Code Ann. §§ 5–5–201 to 5–5–215; see also id. at § 2–4–102(1).
143. Id. at § 2–4–402(1).
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rules;144 to obtain agency rulemaking records;145 to submit oral or written
comments to the agency in any rulemaking procedure;146 to require agency
compliance with MAPA rulemaking procedures;147 and to institute, inter-
vene in, or otherwise participate in any judicial agency proceeding involv-
ing the MAPA.148  The legislative committee may object to the rule,149 in
which case the agency must respond, and the legislative committee’s objec-
tion significantly impacts the agency’s burden of proof on judicial review of
any such rule.150  If the objection is not resolved, the committee may pub-
lish its objection and the agency’s response along with the final rule.151  A
published legislative committee objection requires the agency, in any judi-
cial review proceeding, to prove that the rule was adopted in substantial
compliance with MAPA rulemaking procedures.152  Failing in that burden
may result in the court imposing costs and attorney fees against the agency.
The legislative committee may also poll the entire legislature to deter-
mine whether a proposed rule is consistent with legislative intent.153  Fi-
nally, the legislature may repeal any MAPA rule.154  But failure of the leg-
islature or any legislative review committee to object to a rule is inadmissi-
ble in a court proceeding regarding the validity of the rule.155
ii. Economic Impact Statements
A legislative administrative rule review committee may, prior to final
agency action,156 require an agency to prepare an economic impact state-
ment, or the committee may contract with a third-party to prepare a cost
estimate, regarding a proposed rule (excluding emergency or temporary
144. Id. at §§ 2–4–402(2), 2–4–411.
145. Id. at § 2–4–402(2)(a) (“The appropriate administrative rule review committee may request and
obtain an agency’s rulemaking records for the purpose of reviewing compliance with 2–4–305.”).
146. Id. at § 2–4–402(2)(b) (“The appropriate administrative rule review committee may . . .  pre-
pare written recommendations for the adoption, amendment, or rejection of a rule and submit those
recommendations to the department proposing the rule and submit oral or written testimony at a
rulemaking hearing.”).
147. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–402(2)(c) (“The appropriate administrative rule review committee may
. . .  require that a rulemaking hearing be held in accordance with the provisions of 2–4–302 through
2–4–305.”).
148. Id. at § 2–4–402.
149. Id. at § 2–4–406(1).
150. Id. at § 2–4–406(1)–(2).
151. Id. at § 2–4–406(3).
152. Id. at § 2–4–406(4).
153. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 2–4–403 to 2–4–404.
154. Id. at § 2–4–412(1).
155. Id. at § 4–4–412(4); but see Dept. of Health & Envtl. Sci. v. Lincoln Co., 584 P.2d 1293, 1295
(Mont. 1978) (the fact that the legislature did not object to the agency rule or amend the underlying
legislation for three legislative sessions is evidence that the rule is consistent with legislative intent),
overruled on other grounds,  Buxbaum, 69 P.3d at 674.
156. Mont. Code Ann. § 42–4–405(3).
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rules157).158  The MAPA imposes a number of requirements for such an
impact statement.159  The committee alone must determine the sufficiency
of the agency’s statement.160  A final agency rule is not subject to challenge
on judicial review as a result of the accuracy or adequacy of the impact
statement.161
The authority of the legislature to propose, amend or reject agency
rules and to institute or intervene in any judicial review of an agency rule,
allows the legislature to assure that agency rules conform with its intent.
Additionally, the legislative authority to assure that an agency is aware of
the relative cost-benefit of any proposed rule provides a valuable control on
unnecessary or inappropriate agency overreaching.
B. The MAPA Contested Case Hearing
1. The Formal Contested Case Hearing
As noted above, a MAPA contested case is a quasi-judicial agency
proceeding as contrasted with quasi-legislative actions such as rulemaking,
in which a hearing is “required by law.”  Though, not every quasi-judicial
matter requires a contested hearing.  Absent a statutory or constitutional
requirement for an agency “hearing,” a MAPA agency proceeding is not a
contested case hearing.162  The hallmark of a contested case is that the po-
157. Id. at § 2–4–405(5).
158. Id. at § 2–4–405(1).
159. Id. at § 2–4–405(2)(a)–(h), which provides that the requested statement must include:
(a) a description of the classes of persons who will be affected by the proposed rule . . .;
(b) a description of the probable economic impact of the proposed rule upon affected classes
of persons . . .;
(c) the probable costs to the agency and to any other agency of the implementation and en-
forcement of the proposed rule and any anticipated effect on state revenue;
(d) an analysis comparing the costs and benefits of the proposed rule to the costs and benefits
of inaction;
(e) an analysis that determines whether there are less costly or less intrusive methods for
achieving the purpose of the proposed rule;
(f) an analysis of any alternative methods for achieving the purpose of the proposed rule that
were seriously considered by the agency and the reasons why they were rejected in favor
of the proposed rule;
(g) a determination as to whether the proposed rule represents an efficient allocation of public
and private resources; and
(h) a quantification or description of the data upon which subsections (2)(a) through (2)(g) are
based and an explanation of how the data was gathered.
160. Id. at § 2–4–405(4).
161. Id. at § 2–4–405(6).
162. Roos v. Kircher Pub. Sch. Bd. Of Trustees, 86 P.3d 39, 41 (Mont. 2004) (the appellant did “not
allege any violation of state statute that grants an administrative hearing or a constitutionally protected
interest” that triggers a due process hearing).
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tential party aggrieved by any agency action is entitled to a “trial-type”
hearing.
i. The Contested Case Hearing Process
In general, the MAPA contested case pre-hearing and hearing process
mirrors a judicial civil bench trial.  Consequently, it is often said that the
contested case process requires a “trial-type” hearing.163  However, as in a
civil trial, no hearing is required if there are no material issues of fact in
dispute—the matter may be disposed of on a motion for summary judgment
or motion to dismiss.164
ii. Notice of the MAPA Hearing and Discovery
In contrast to a judicial civil matter where the process commences with
the moving party’s complaint, the administrative contested case process
commences with a written agency notice165 coupled with service of pro-
cess.166  While a citizen complaint to the agency may result in an agency to
issue a notice, it is the agency notice that initiates the contested case pro-
ceeding.
In addition to the specifics required of the agency “notice,”167 it must
sufficiently convey the issues to be defended168 because the constitutional
right of notice is the same whether in an administrative proceeding or in a
court.169  The MAPA also provides that the recipient of an agency notice
may apply to the agency for a more definite and detailed statement.170
As in a judicial civil proceeding, an agency-contested party is entitled
to discovery consistent with the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure.171  Ad-
ditionally, the MAPA authorizes the agency to issue subpoenas, including
163. McCrory, supra n. 2, at 51–52 (a “contested case” is one in which a determination of legal
rights, duties or privileges must be made after an opportunity for a “trial-type” hearing).
164. In re Peila, 815 P.2d 139, 144 (Mont. 1991) (“[D]ue process does not require development of
facts through an evidentiary hearing when there are no material factual issues in dispute.”). See also
Anaconda School Dist. v. Whealan, 263 P.3d 1258, 1262 (Mont. 2012) (summary judgment is permissi-
ble in a contested case).
165. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–603.
166. Admin. R. Mont. § 1.3.232 (unless otherwise provide by law and the Administrative Rules of
Montana, “all motions and pleadings must be served in accordance with the Montana Rules of Civil
Procedure”).
167. Supra nn. 96–122 on notice requirements.
168. Bd. of Trustees of Billings Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. State, 604 P.2d 778, 780 (Mont. 1979).
169. Klundt v. State, 712 P.2d 776, 779 (Mont. 1986).
170. Admin. R. Mont. § 1.3.216.
171. Id. at § 1.3.217 (Montana Rules of Civil Procedure 26–37 apply, excluding rules 27, 37(b)(1),
and 37(b)(2)(D)); see also Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–602.
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subpoenas duces tecum.172  The advantage of an agency subpoena is that
discovery is limited to contested case parties, whereas an agency subpoena
may reach well beyond the parties, their proposed witnesses, and the spe-
cific subject matter of any contested case.  The reach of an agency-issued
subpoena is commensurate with the agency’s jurisdiction.
iii. The Hearing
In a MAPA contested case proceeding, issues of fact are determined as
the result of a “trial-type” hearing or through informal disposition.  The
trial-type hearing is the default process unless the parties stipulate to infor-
mal disposition.
As previously noted, a formal MAPA contested case hearing resem-
bles a judicial bench trial of a civil matter.  The MAPA provides that the
agency may conduct the contested case hearing itself or, more likely, may
appoint an agency member or a hearings examiner.173  In federal adminis-
trative law, an “administrative law judge” occupies what MAPA calls a
“hearings examiner.”  The agency must appoint a hearings examiner with
“due regard to the expertise required for the particular matter but need not
be an attorney.”174  A hearings examiner may be disqualified for “personal
bias, lack of independence, disqualification by law, or other disqualifica-
tion.”175
Whoever conducts the agency hearing is accorded broad authority to
do so.176  As in the case with any civil proceeding, the party asserting the
claim or initiating the action has the burden of proof177 and is afforded the
opportunity to “respond and present evidence and argument on all issues
involved.”178  This includes the right to “conduct cross-examinations . . .
[and] the right to cross-examine the author of any document prepared by or
on behalf of or for the use of the agency and offered in evidence.”179  The
hearing must be transcribed,180 and, in the event of judicial review, the
agency must present the complete administrative record to the court.181  The
172. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–104; see also Admin. R. Mont. § 1.3.230 (compliance may be com-
pelled via a district court order).
173. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–611; see also Admin. R. Mont. § 1.3.218(1).
174. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–611(1).
175. Id. at § 2–4–611(4); see also In re Sorini, 717 P.2d 7, 9 (Mont. 1986).
176. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–611(3).
177. Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Dept. of Envtl. Quality, 112 P.3d 964, 967 (Mont. 2005).
178. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–612(1).
179. Id. at § 2–4–612(5).
180. Id. at § 2–4–614; State ex rel Bd. of Personnel Apps. v. Dist. Ct., 556 P.2d 1238, 1239 (Mont.
1976) (if the administrative hearing was tape recorded, a reviewing court could order that a printed
transcript of the recordings be made).
181. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–704; see also Owens v. Dept. of Revenue, 130 P.3d 1256, 1258 (Mont.
2006) (agency must forward the complete contested case record to the reviewing court).
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MAPA also provides that if a contested case does not involve a disputed
issue of material fact, parties may jointly stipulate in writing to waive con-
tested case proceedings182 and may directly petition the district court for
judicial review pursuant to the MAPA contested case judicial review provi-
sions.183
iv. Evidence in the Formal Contested Case Hearing
Except as provided by statute relating directly to the agency,184 in the
contested case hearing, the presiding officer must apply the common law
and statutory rules of evidence.185 However, because the administrative
case is heard without a jury, the rules of evidence and admissibility are
more relaxed than in a civil or criminal jury trial.  Consistent with the rules
for a civil trial, a reviewing court will not reverse a lower tribunal’s alleged
errors regarding the admission of evidence “absent an abuse of discre-
tion.”186  In the event of an abuse of discretion, for the “error to be the basis
for a new trial, it must be so significant as to materially affect the substan-
tial rights of the complaining party.”187  And, when the lower tribunal is a
judicial bench trial judge, “there is a presumption that the trial judge has
disregarded all inadmissible evidence in reaching his decision.”188  Because
a contested case decision must have written findings and conclusions,189 the
careful administrative hearings examiner need not rely on such a presump-
tion.
It is well settled that exclusionary rules of evidence are generally more
relaxed in an administrative proceeding than in a civil jury trial.190  The
182. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–603(1)(a).
183. Id. at §§ 2–4–603(3), 2–4–702(2)(b) (the judicial review petition must contain an agreed state-
ment of facts and a statement of the legal issues or contentions of the parties upon which the court,
together with the additions it may consider necessary to fully present the issues, may make its decision).
184. The Montana Board of Personnel Appeals is an example of a MAPA agency that does not have
to apply the common law and statutory rules of evidence because its authorizing/enabling legislation
specifically provides: “In a hearing, the board is not bound by the rules of evidence prevailing in the
courts.” Id. at § 39–3–406(2).
185. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–612(2) (“Except as otherwise provided by statute relating directly to
an agency, agencies shall be bound by common law and statutory rules of evidence.”)  The Model Rules
provide: “Unless otherwise provided by statute, all evidence introduced in a contested case hearing shall
be received and evaluated in conformance with common law and statutory rules of evidence.”  Admin.
R. Mont. § 1.3.221; see also Pannoni v. Bd. of Trustees, 90 P.3d 438, 451 (Mont. 2004).
186. Peschke v. Carroll College, 929 P.2d 874, 881 (Mont. 1996).
187. Id.
188. In re Moyer, 567 P.2d 47, 49 (Mont. 1977) (stating that when a district court is hearing a case
without a jury, “there is a presumption that the trial judge has disregarded all inadmissible evidence in
reaching his decision.”  The Court then said there is nothing in the record to “rebut this presumption.”).
189. See infra nn. 213–218.
190. See Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law Text, § 14.03, (3rd Ed. West 1973).
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administrative hearings examiner, like the civil bench trial judge,191 rou-
tinely reviews or otherwise learns the substance of proposed evidence well
before it is offered.  Even if the administrative hearings examiner admits
evidence that would be otherwise inadmissible, there is no prejudicial error
if the evidence is not relied upon in making fact-findings.192  As the Court
has noted: “Often the hearing examiner in a formal contested case hearing
will admit the evidence and will consider the weight to be given to such
evidence when preparing findings and conclusions from all the evi-
dence.”193
Indeed, on questions of admissibility, a hearings examiner has a
greater risk of reversal by excluding evidence rather than including evi-
dence in the hearing record.  This does not mean that inadmissible evidence
should be relied upon in making findings of fact, but if the proposed evi-
dence does not appear in the record, the reviewing tribunal will not have the
evidence to consider issues of admissibility and weight.  Indeed, it is often
advised that, when in doubt, the person conducting the hearing, should con-
ditionally admit the evidence and, in the quiet of preparing a written pro-
posed decision, decide the ultimate question—whether to rely on evidence
that was the subject of an objection.194
Certainly, rules of evidence should not be allowed to atrophy into a
disregard of due process of law and fundamental individual rights.195  But
191. It has long been settled that an appellate court will not reverse a judgment in a nonjury case
because of the admission of incompetent evidence, unless all of the competent evidence is insufficient to
support the judgment or unless it affirmatively appears that the incompetent evidence induced the court
to make an essential finding which would not otherwise have been made. Builders Steel Co. v. Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue, 179 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1950). See 2B W. Barron & A. Holtzoff, Federal
Practice and Procedure Sec. 972 (Wright ed. 1961).  Professor Wright tells us that “[t]he attitude now
governing has been strongly stated by Judge Sanborn: ‘In the trial of a nonjury case, it is virtually
impossible for a trial judge to commit reversible error by receiving incompetent evidence, whether
objected to or not.” Id. at 268.
192. See Kauffman v. Dept. of Com., 746 P.2d 103, 106 (Mont. 1987) (indicating there was no
prejudice where the hearings examiner admitted an exhibit over objection but thereafter rejected the
exhibit in making findings of fact); see also In re Moyer, 567 P.2d at 49 (in a civil bench trial the
Montana Supreme Court has stated that there is a presumption that the trial judge sitting without a jury
has disregarded all inadmissible evidence in reaching his decision).
193. In re Renewal of Teaching Certificate of Thompson, 893 P.2d 301, 305 (Mont. 1995).
194. Multi-Med. Convalescent v. N.L.R.B., 550 F.2d 974, 977 (4th Cir. 1977) (“In a nonjury trial,
whether in the district court or before an administrative law judge, little harm can result from the recep-
tion of evidence that could perhaps be excluded.  This is so because the judge, trial or administrative, is
presumably competent to screen out and disregard what she thinks she should not have heard, or to
discount it for practical and sensible reasons.  On the other hand, to exclude that which is competent and
relevant by mechanistic application of an exclusionary rule is exceedingly dangerous to the administra-
tive or trial process and may well result in vacating the judgment or order on procedural due process
grounds.”); Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378, 380 (2d Cir. 1945).
195. Hert v. J.J. Newberry Co., 504 p.2d 656, 661 (Mont. 1978) (while the rules of evidence are
more relaxed in administrative proceedings that in a court of law, these rules will not be relaxed to the
point where due process of law and fundamental rights are disregarded).
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this is not the situation in the typical case, where the hearings examiner
admits evidence over objection and thereafter does not rely on it in making
findings of fact.  Indeed, the best way for a hearings examiner to handle
evidence admitted over objection, but thereafter not relied upon, is to spe-
cifically state that the evidence was disregarded in making the fact-find-
ings.196  If the hearings examiner admits and relies on improper evidence
over an objection, the reviewing court will reverse197 if such reliance “ma-
terially affect[s] the substantial rights of the complaining party.”198
The MAPA includes several more specific evidentiary provisions.
Documents may be received in the form of copies or excerpts if the original
is not readily available.199  Testimony is to be under “oath or affirma-
tion.”200  Objections to evidentiary offers may be made and shall be noted
in the record.201  Notice may be taken of generally recognized technical or
scientific facts within the agency’s specialized knowledge,202 and the
agency may use its experience, technical competence, and specialized
knowledge in the evaluation of evidence.203  Finally, as a means of expedit-
ing the hearing when the interests of the parties will not be substantially
prejudiced, “any part of the evidence may be received in written form.”204
196. Kauffman, 746 P.2d at 106 (there is no prejudice where the hearings examiner admitted an
exhibit over objection but thereafter rejected the exhibit in making findings of fact).
197. In re Thompson, 893 P.2d at 305 (the Court reversed when the hearing examiner improperly
relied on testimony of an expert concerning the behavior of victims of sexual abuse, and when the
evidence was properly disregarded, there was not sufficient evidence to support the finding).
198. Peschke, 929 P.2d at 881.
199. But upon request, a party is to be given the “opportunity to compare the copy with the original.”
Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–612(3).
200. Id. at § 2–4–612(4).
201. Id. at § 2–4–612(2).
202. Hert, 584 P.2d at 662 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 201(a)–(b)) (a judicially noticed fact must be one
not subject to reasonable dispute); see also Miller v. Frasure, 871 P.2d 1302, 1309 (Mont. 1994) (re-
garding medical records in workers’ compensation trials); see also Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–612(6)
(regarding official notice, “[p]arties shall be notified either before or during the hearing or by reference
in preliminary reports or otherwise of the material noticed, including any staff memoranda or data.  They
shall be afforded an opportunity to contest the material so noticed.”).
203. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–612(7).  For an excellent case discussing  and distinguishing between
the use of agency specialized knowledge as evidence and the evaluation of evidence, see  Banks v.
Schweiker, 654 F.2d 637, 641 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing McCormick, Law of Evid. § 333, at 771 (2nd ed.
1972)) (distinguishing the use of agency specialized knowledge as evidence and the evaluation of evi-
dence; when an agency relies on its expertise and specialized knowledge as evidence, it must place that
information in the record as matters officially noticed and provide the opponent of the evidence “an
opportunity to present information ‘which might bear upon the propriety of noticing the fact, or upon the
truth of the matter to be noticed.’”).
204. Mont Code Ann. § 2–4–612(2); see Johnson v. Bd. of Trustees, 771 P.2d 137, 142 (Mont.
1989) (consideration of transcripts and videotaped testimony taken during school board hearing was
admissible because it expedited the disposition of the issue without substantial prejudice to the teacher).
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2. The Initial and Final Agency Decisions
i. The Proposed Decision
Although an agency may conduct its own contested case hearings,205
agencies often appoint a hearings examiner to do so.  Indeed, for agencies
with multi-member boards or commissions, it may be impracticable for the
entire body to conduct a contested case hearing.  Even agencies with a sin-
gle administrator, such as a commissioner, may not have anyone qualified
to conduct a contested case hearing.  In such a situation, the agency can
appoint a hearings examiner from within or outside the agency.206  If the
agency appoints a hearings examiner to conduct the hearing and the agency
was not present during the hearing, the hearings examiner is required to
prepare a written proposed decision for the agency, which the agency may
review before issuing a final decision.207  An agency member who conducts
the hearing may participate in the formulation of the agency’s final order,
provided that the hearings officer has completed his or her duties.208  If, in
accord with agency rules, a party submits proposed findings of fact, the
decision must include a ruling upon each proposed finding.209  The hearings
examiner’s proposed decision must include findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and reasoning.210  If the hearings examiner becomes unavailable to the
agency, proposed findings of fact may be prepared by a person who has
205. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–611(1) (indicating that “[a]n agency may appoint hearing examiners
for the conduct of hearings in contested cases.”).
206. Id. at § 2–4–611(2) (“An agency may elect to request a hearing examiner from its legal assis-
tance program, if any, within the attorney general’s office or from another agency.  If the request is
honored, the time, date, and place of the hearing must be set by the agency, with the concurrence of the
legal assistance program or the other agency.”).
207. However, there are circumstances when inter-agency review by a higher authority requires a
more formal process. See e.g. Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr., 112 P.3d at 969 (the Court held that the Board of
Environmental Review applied the wrong standard of review, when reviewing Department of Environ-
mental Quality’s action.  The Board was directed by § 75–2–211(10) to hold a hearing pursuant to the
contested case provision of MAPA on a review of the Department’s decision.  In such a review the
Board was to hold a hearing and make findings of fact and conclusions of law.  It was not merely to
determine whether the Department’s decision was arbitrary, capricious or represented an abuse of dis-
cretion.  The Court notes that in some internal administrative appeals the appellate tribunal is not to
conduct a hearing but to review the existing record “applying a standard of review substantially similar
to that applied by a district court in judicial review of a contested case under § 2–4–704(2)(a).”  It notes
that this latter standard of review is the type the superintendent of public instruction performs in review-
ing a decision of a county superintendent).
208. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–621(4).
209. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–623(2), (4); see Mont. Wilderness Assn. v. Bd. of Nat. Resources &
Conserv., 648 P.2d 734, 742 (Mont. 1982) (a separate and express ruling on each proposed finding of
fact is not required as long as the agency’s decision and order are clear); see also Consumer Counsel v.
P.S.C. & Mont. Power Co., 541 P.2d 770, 774 (Mont. 1975) (express ruling on each proposed finding is
not necessary where the agency’s decision and order on a party’s proposal is clear).
210. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–621(2).
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read the record only if all parties consider the demeanor of witnesses imma-
terial.211  Alternatively, if witness demeanor is material to the decision and
is disputed by the parties, a new hearing must have to be held.
ii. The Final Decision
When a majority of the officials in the agency that is to render a final
decision have not heard the evidence, (i.e. appointed a hearings examiner),
and if the final decision is adverse to a party to the proceeding, other than
the agency itself, a final agency decision may not be made until a proposed
decision is served upon the parties.  Before a final agency decision may be
issued, each party is afforded the opportunity to file exceptions, supported
by briefs and oral argument to the final decision maker(s).212  Additionally,
a party may submit proposed findings of fact, and the agency must specifi-
cally rule on the proposals.213
A final agency decision must be in writing.214  The agency may adopt,
reject, or modify the proposed decision, especially regarding conclusions
and applications of law, including the interpretation and application of the
agency’s rules.215  But the agency may not reject or modify the findings of
fact unless it determines from the complete record and states with particu-
larity in the order that the findings were based on insufficient evidence or
legally flawed proceedings.216  Finally, the agency may accept or reduce the
recommended penalty of the proposed decision but may not increase it
without a review of the complete record.217
The agency’s final decision has stricter formatting requirements than
the hearing examiner’s proposed decision,218 but those requirements may be
211. Id. at § 2–4–622.
212. Id. at §§ 2–4–621(1), 2–4–622(2).
213. Id. at § 2–4–623(4).
214. Id. at § 4–2–623(1)(b).
215. Id. at §§ 2–4–621(3), 2–4–622(2); see also In re Sorini, 717 P.2d at 10 (the agency is not
required to specifically rule on the exceptions).
216. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–621(3); see also Ulrich v. State, 961 P.2d 126, 129 (Mont. 1998) (an
agency commits an abuse of discretion if it rejects a hearings examiner’s findings of fact without stating
with particularity that the findings are not based upon competent, substantial evidence); Moran v. Shot-
gun Willies, Inc., 889 P.2d 1185, 1187–1188 (Mont. 1995) (reversing the Montana Human Rights Com-
mission’s reversal of its hearing officer’s findings of fact where the initial finding was based on credibil-
ity and the person who hears the testimony is best positioned to make credibility findings); State Person-
nel Div., Dept. of Admin. v. Child Support Investigators, 43 P.3d 305, 316 (Mont. 2002) (Board of
Personnel Appeals was not bound by its hearing officer’s conclusions of law or the State Personnel
Division’s interpretation of its rules and practices).  As to hearing examiner’s proposed order, see also
City of Billings v. State Human Rights Comm., 681 P.2d 33, 37 (Mont. 1984) (regarding hearing exam-
iner’s proposed order) and State By and Through Dept. of Social & Rehab. Serv. v. Shodair Hosp., 902
P.2d 21, 24 (Mont. 1995).
217. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–621(3).
218. Id. at § 2–4–623(1)(a).
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somewhat relaxed so long as the final decision is sufficiently clear.219  If the
proposed decision does satisfy the formatting requirements applicable to a
final decision, the agency may merely adopt the hearings examiners’ pro-
posed decision as written.220  The agency must notify parties of any final
decision and must provide a copy of the decision or order at a party’s re-
quest.221  More commonly, the agency simply includes a copy of the final
decision and order with the notice.  Every MAPA agency must index and
make available for public inspection all final decisions and orders, includ-
ing any declaratory rulings.222  Except for those with actual notice or dis-
closure, no such decision, order, or ruling is valid until it has been made
available for public inspection.223  Consequently, prior agency-contested
case decisions are available and may be consulted in preparing for litiga-
tion.224  As a general rule, the agency’s final decision must issue within 90
days.225
iii. The Informal  Disposition
Contested case parties may agree in writing to waive the formal con-
tested case process and proceed under the MAPA informal case process,226
except in professional or occupational licensure cases,227 or where other-
wise precluded by law.  Additionally, some Montana State agencies are di-
rected by statute to use the MAPA informal hearing process.228  The infor-
mal proceeding provides for the possibility of:
• an informal pre-hearing conference;229
• a hearing before the agency or hearings examiner;230
219. Mont. Wilderness Assn., 648 P.2d at 750 (“While each finding is not immediately followed by
the supporting underlying facts, when the findings and decision are viewed as a whole, it will be seen
that the findings are adequately factually supported.”); Bd. of Trustees, Clinton Sch. Dist. No. 32  v. Bd.
of Trustees, Bonner Sch. Dist. No. 14, 719 P.2d 1240, 1242–1243 (Mont. 1986) (while a final decision is
to have findings of fact, where the court found the record to support the agency’s findings, it affirmed
the agency).
220. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–621(3).
221. Id. at § 2–4–623(5).
222. Id. at § 2–4–623(6).
223. Id.
224. Frequently, prior agency contested case decisions may be obtained from the agency’s website.
225. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–623(1)(a).
226. Id. at § 2–4–603(2) (stating in part: “Except as otherwise provided, parties to a contested case
may jointly waive in writing a formal proceeding under this part.”).
227. Id. at § 2–4–603(2) (stating in part: “Parties to contested case proceedings held under Title 37
[which exclusively involves professions and occupations] or another provision relating to licensure to
pursue a profession or occupation may not waive formal [contested case] proceedings.”).
228. Id. at § 2–2–136(1)(c) (an example of Montana Ethics Code proceedings before the Commis-
sioner of Political Practices, providing for informal contested case hearings).
229. Admin. R. Mont. § 1.3.215(3) (providing that the pre-hearing conference may be used “to de-
fine issues, determine witnesses and agree upon stipulations.”).
230. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–604(1)(a).
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• the presentation of written and oral evidence, under oath,231 in opposition
to the agency’s action or refusal to act;232
• a written challenge to the “grounds upon which the agency has chosen to
act or not to act;”233 and
• any other “written or oral evidence relating to the subject of the contested
case.”234
An agency must base its decision in an informal hearing on the record,
and the record must consist of:
• proper agency notice to the party or counsel;235
• the reason(s) that the party or counsel opposed the agency action or inac-
tion;236
• evidence offered by the party(s) and considered by the agency;237
• party objections and agency rulings on the objections;238
• any matters placed on the record concerning any ex parte communications
by the decision maker;239
• the recording of any hearing held;240
• a statement of the evidence received and considered;241
• all rules of privilege are applicable to the informal proceeding;242 the
agency may observe a more relaxed standard regarding the admissibility
of evidence, including the consideration of hearsay;243
• party objections; and
• the basis for the agency’s decision.244
231. Id. at § 2–4–604(4).
232. Id. at § 2–4–604(1)(a)(i).
233. Id. at § 2–4–604(1)(a)(ii).
234. Id. at § 2–4–604(1)(a)(iii) (providing that the opportunity to present “other written or oral evi-
dence relating to the contested case”).
235. Id. at § 2–4–604(2)(a) (providing that the record of the informal contested case proceeding
must contain “the notice . . . and summary of grounds of the opposition”).
236. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–604(2)(a) (providing that the record of the informal contested case
proceeding must contain a “summary of grounds of the opposition”).
237. Id. at § 2–4–604(2)(b), (e) (providing that the record of the informal contested case proceeding
must contain the “evidence offered or considered,” that the record must contain the “written or oral
statement of the parties or other person,” that the requirement that the record contain the “written or oral
statement of the parties or other person” appears to be contained in the broader requirement that the
record contain the “evidence offered or considered,” and that the assumption is that “statements” by
“parties or other persons” would be presented at the hearing as “evidence”).
238. Id. at § 2–4–604(2)(c) (stating the record of the informal contested case proceeding must con-
tain “objections and rulings on the objections”).
239. Id. at § 2–4–604(2)(d) (stating the record of the informal contested case proceeding must con-
tain “all matters placed on the record after ex parte communications pursuant to 2–4–613 [the MAPA ex
parte communications provision]”).
240. Id. at § 2–4–604(2)(e) (providing the record of the informal contested case proceeding must
contain “a recording of any hearing held”).
241. Id. at § 2–4–604(2)(e) (providing that the record of the informal contested case proceeding
must contain a recording of any hearing “together with a statement of the substance of the evidence
received or considered”).
242. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–604(3).
243. Id. at § 2–4–604(4).
244. Id. at § 2–4–604(2)(a) (stating the record of the informal contested case proceeding must con-
tain a “summary of grounds of the opposition”).
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IV. AGENCY DECLARATIONS ON RULES AND ORDERS
The MAPA requires agencies to have a rule to provide for the filing
and prompt dispositions of petitions for declaratory rulings as to “the appli-
cability of any statutory provision or of any rule or order of the agency.”245
The Attorney General’s Model Administrative Rules implement this provi-
sion.246  This provision allows a person to question whether a MAPA
agency would potentially challenge an action of the person or entity, or to
determine the potential entitlement of any government benefit which the
agency may grant or withhold.  Consequently, if a client’s rights and obli-
gations under agency law are unclear, counsel need only file an action for
declaratory judgment with the agency to obtain a ruling.   This will answer
the question of how an agency would respond before the client acts.  An
agency’s declaratory ruling is binding between the agency and the peti-
tioner.  The ruling, or agency’s failure to rule, is subject to judicial review
in the same manner as a contested case.247  An agency’s declaratory ruling
is not prerequisite for seeking judicial review of an agency rule.
V. THE METHOD FOR OBTAINING JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
AGENCY ACTIONS
A. The MAPA Judicial Review Provisions
The MAPA judicial review provisions—which apply only in the ab-
sence of specific judicial review language in a particular agency’s authoriz-
ing or enabling legislation—are found in two places in the Act.  The MAPA
agency rules are reviewed pursuant to Montana Code Annotated
§§ 2–4–305(6) and 506.  The MAPA contested cases248 are reviewed under
Montana Code Annotated §§ 2–4–701 through 711.   Agency decisions
other than rules or contested cases are reviewed under general statutory or
common law.  Such decisions generally involve quasi-judicial matters not
contested cases because a hearing is neither required by statute or constitu-
tional due process.  An example of which is Johansen.249  Courts also rely
on common law and general statutory law to review non-MAPA agency
quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative decisions.
245. Id. at § 2–4–501.
246. See Admin. R. Mont. § 1.3.226–1.3.229 (providing agency declaratory agency rule language
and a practice form to assist in drafting an appropriate motion for an agency declaratory judgment).
247. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–501.
248. A contested case is a quasi-judicial proceeding where a hearing is required by law, i.e., the
agency-authorizing statute requires a “hearing” or a hearing is required by Constitutional due process.
249. See supra nn. 60–64.
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1. Review of MAPA Agency Rules
The MAPA agency rules are subject to judicial review in an action for
declaratory judgment.250  Venue for such an action is generally the judicial
district in which the plaintiff resides, has a principal place of business, or in
which the agency maintains its principal office.251  The 30-day limitation
for petitioning for judicial review of a contested case is not applicable to a
MAPA petition for declaratory judgment review of an agency rule.252
While the issue of standing normally appears when petitioner seeks judicial
review of an agency quasi-judicial decision, it also may arise in the context
of a challenge to an agency rule.253
2. Review of MAPA Contested Cases
i. Initiating Judicial Review—Petition, Timing, Content, Venue,
Service, Stay of Agency Order, and Agency Transmittal
of Record
Under the MAPA, except under narrow circumstances,254 judicial re-
view255 of a contested case256 is initiated by filing a “petition” in Montana
district court257 “within 30 days after service of the final written decision258
250. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–506(1)–(2) (a Montana district court may declare a MAPA agency rule
invalid or inapplicable).
251. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–506(4); see Missoula City-Co. Air Pollution Control Bd. v. Bd. of
Envtl. Rev., 937 P.2d 463, 469 (Mont. 1997).
252. Missoula City-Co. Air Pollution Control Bd., 937 P.2d at 469 (amended petition filed three
months after adoption of the rule was found timely).
253. Id. at 466–468.
254. Mont. Air Quality Act (Mont. Code Ann. §§ 75–2–211, 75–2–213 (now reserved)) and Work-
ers’ Compensation Classification review Committee determinations which are reviewed by the Workers’
Compensation Court. Id. at § 33–16–1012(2)(c).
255. In re Marriage of Davis, 921 P.2d 275, 276–277 (Mont. 1996) (judicial review is for the pur-
pose of having a court reverse an agency quasi-judicial decision, not for seeking damages from the
agency or the government for the actions of the agency); Walch v. Univ. of Mont., 716 P.2d 640 (Mont.
1986) (if the agency’s orders are not self-enforcing, and the agency is authorized to bring a court action
for enforcement under its authorizing or enabling statute, the judicial proceeding for enforcement is
governed by the authorizing or enabling statute and not MAPA).
256. In re Application of Galt, 644 P.2d 1019, 1021 (Mont. 1982) (illustrating that judicial review of
agency rules and quasi-judicial matters which are not MAPA contested cases are not subject to MAPA;
a Montana Public Service Commission certificate issuing process is not a contested case, and hence
MAPA judicial review does not apply); see also Selon v. Bd. of Personnel Appeals, 634 P.2d 646, 648
(Mont. 1982).
257. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–702(2)(c) (if the petition for review is filed pursuant to
§ 33–16–1012(2)(c), the Workers’ Compensation Court rather than a district court has jurisdiction).
258. See Weber v. Pub. Employees Ret. Bd., 890 P.2d 1296, 1299 (Mont. 1995) (a petition for judi-
cial review within 30 days of the written agency decision is timely); MCA Telecomm. Corp. v. Dept. of
Pub. Serv. Reg., 858 P.2d 364, 366–367 (1993) (when service of the agency decision is made by email,
Rule 6(e) of the Mont. R. Civ. P. provides that an additional 3 days must be added from the date of the
agency decision to seek judicial review); accord Molnar v. Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm’n., 177 P.3d 1048,
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of the agency, or if a rehearing is requested, within 30 days after the written
decision is rendered.”259  This filing deadline is jurisdictional, and failure to
seek judicial review in the time provided by statute makes such an appeal
ineffective for any purpose.260  The petition must include a concise state-
ment of the basis for jurisdiction and venue, a statement of the manner in
which the petitioner is aggrieved, the grounds upon which the petitioner
contends to be entitled to relief, and the relief sought.261
Generally,262 except when provided by the specific agency enabling or
authorizing statute, venue for the petition is the district court for the county
where the petitioner resides or its principal place of business or where the
agency maintains its principal office.263  A petition filed in an improper
venue does not, however, deprive that district court of jurisdiction to review
the matter.264
The petition must be served upon the agency and all parties of re-
cord.265  A petitioner must serve the petition as prescribed by the Montana
Rules of Civil Procedure unless a statute specifically provides otherwise.266
Unless provided by statute, a petition for review does not stay the agency
order.267  But the agency or the reviewing court may stay the agency’s order
on terms that it considers proper, following notice to all parties and oppor-
1051–1052 (Mont. 2008); compare with In re Support of McGurran, 983 P.2d 968, 971–972 (Mont.
1999).
259. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–702(2)(a); In re McGurran, 983 P.2d 968, 972) (the 30-day deadline is
not extended under Rule 60(b), Mont. R. Civ. P. pursuant to “excusable neglect” to timely file).  But if
the agency does not have the authority to entertain rehearing, the 30-day period commences on the date
of the written decision. Bradco Supply Co., 598 P.2d at 599.
260. In re McGurran, 983 P.2d 968.  The petition must contain a concise statement of the facts upon
which jurisdiction (Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–701(1)(a) and venue (Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–702(2)(a)
are based, a statement of the manner in which the petitioner is aggrieved, and the ground or grounds
specified in Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–704(2) [appropriate standard of review] upon which the petitioner
contends to be entitled to relief, and the relief demanded (demands for relief may be in the alternative).
Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–702(2)(b).
261. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–702(2)(b).
262. Id. at § 2–4–702(2)(d).
263. Id. at § 2–4–702(2).  For a non-MAPA agency, county agency venue is the county where the
plaintiff resides. State ex. rel. Hendrickson v. Gallatin Co., 526 P.2d 354, 356–357 (Mont. 1974).
264. In re McGurran, 49 P.3d 626, 630 (Mont. 2002).
265. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–702(2)(a). See also Pickens, 3 P.3d at 606 (proper service of a petition
for judicial review is a threshold requirement for the district court to obtain jurisdiction, and a petition
for judicial review may be properly served by mailing copies to the agency and other parties—there is
no requirement that a summons be issued and served); see also In re McGurran, 70 P.3d at 736 (Mont.
2003).  Where the agency is merely an umpiring entity, it is not an indispensable party. Young v. Great
Falls, 632 P.2d 1111, 1113 (Mont. 1981). But see In re Protests to the Application for Transfer of
Ownership of Mont. Retail On-Premises Consumption Beer/Wine License, 196 P.3d 1233, 1236 (Mont.
2008); Hilands Golf Club v. Ashmore, 922 P.2d 469, 474 (Mont. 1996).
266. Hilands Golf Club, 922 P.2d at 473.  When service is made by mail, Rule 6(e) of the Montana
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that an additional 3 days must be added to the time for taking action.
267. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–702(3).
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tunity for hearing.268  To issue such a stay without notice, the agency or
reviewing court must follow the statutes for issuing a preliminary injunction
without notice.269  A district court may also issue a stay of an administrative
order.270
Within 30 days after service, or further time if allowed by the court,
the agency must transmit to the reviewing court the whole record of the
proceeding under review.271  Upon stipulation of the parties, the record
transmitted may be shortened to only the relevant portions.  The court may
thereafter require or permit correction or additions to the record.272  Judicial
review of an issue of fact cannot take place without a transcript of testi-
mony from the original hearing.273
ii. Judicial Review of Non-MAPA Quasi-Judicial Proceedings,
Rules, and Other Decisions (Non-MAPA State Agencies
and State Subdivision Agencies)
Non-MAPA agency decisions are not subject to review under MAPA.
Unless the authorizing or enabling legislation for the non-MAPA agency
provides for judicial review and the method for obtaining such review, a
party seeking review must rely on Montana’s Uniform Declaratory Judg-
ments Act,274 writ of mandamus,275 writ of certiorari,276 or writ of prohibi-
tion.277  While these methods of review provide an opportunity, they may
not substitute for a review procedure provided by the MAPA or those con-
tained in the agency’s particular enabling or authorizing statute.278  When
268. Id.
269. Id. (referencing Mont. Code Ann. §§ 27–19–315 to 27-19–317, which deal with the issuance of
preliminary injunctions without notice).
270. Brackman v. Bd. of Nursing, 820 P.2d 1314, 1316 (Mont. 1991).
271. See Owens, 130 P.3d at 1258 (failure of the agency to submit the entire administrative record on
judicial review resulted in court remanding the agency decision).
272. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–702(4).
273. See In re Unfair Labor Practice No. 38-80, 720 P.2d 1181, 1183 (Mont. 1986).
274. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 27–8–101 to 27–8–313.  The Act provides, “Courts of record within their
respective jurisdictions shall have the power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations . . . .” Id.
at § 27–8–201.  Or where “a judgment or decree will terminate the controversy or remove an uncer-
tainty,” id. at § 27–8–205 “further relief based upon a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted
(injunctive) relief whenever necessary or proper.” Id. at § 27–8–208.
275. Id. at § 27–26–102. See also Barnes v. Town of Belgrade, 524 P.2d 1112, 1113 (Mont. 1974)
(mandamus will compel the performance of a clear legal duty not involving discretion, and it will lie to
compel the proper exercise of discretion.  An arbitrary or capricious action by an agency is an abuse of
discretion.).
276. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 27–25–101 to 27–25–305 (certiorari).
277. Id. at §§ 27–27–101 to 27–27–104 (prohibition).
278. In re Dewar, 548 P.2d 149, 154 (Mont. 1976) (mandamus not available where there is an
alternative plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law).  The Montana Code
Annotated specifically provides that mandamus must be issued when certiorari, and prohibition are not
available where there is another “plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.”  Mont. Code Ann. § 27–26–102
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available, writs of mandamus and prohibition are often used because they
permit the recovery of attorney fees.279  Writs of certiorari and prohibition
serve a limited review function because they only address administrative
actions in excess of jurisdiction.280  Both writs are available only for review
of agency quasi-judicial decisions involving exercises of discretion.281
Consequently, non-MAPA agency rules and other non-quasi-judicial mat-
ters are not reviewable with either certiorari or prohibition.
B. Roadblocks to Judicial Review
Judicial review of agency decisions in contested cases is available only
after the appellant has exhausted all administrative remedies available
within the agency and is aggrieved by a final written agency decision.282
Additionally, the Montana Supreme Court has held that judicial review is
available only for issues that are ripe and only for persons with standing to
seek access to the judiciary.283
1. Exhaustion and Finality
Three principles underlie exhaustion and finality: (1) the limited judi-
cial review of administrative decisions strengthens the administrative pro-
cess by encouraging the full presentation of evidence at the initial adminis-
trative hearing; (2) judicial economy requires court recognition of the ex-
pertise of administrative agencies in the field of their responsibility; and (3)
limited judicial review is necessary to determine that a fair procedure was
used, that questions of law were properly decided, and that the decision of
the administrative body was properly supported by evidence.284
(mandamus); Mont. Code Ann. § 27–25–102 (certiorari); Mont. Code Ann. § 27–27–101 to 27–27–104
(prohibition). See Stowe v. Bd. of Administration of Pub. Employees Ret. Div., 564 P.2d 167, 171
(Mont. 1977) (holding that mandamus was the proper remedy because the board acted in contravention
of a statutory requirement); Malta Irrigation Dist. v. Int. Bd. of Health & Envtl. Sci., 729 P.2d 1323,
1327 (Mont. 1986) (affirming the denial of prohibition due to alternative remedy).
279. See Kadillak v. Anaconda Co., 602 P.2d 147, 157 (Mont. 1979) (mandamus); State ex rel.
Taylor v. Dist. Ct. of Eleventh Jud. Dist., 310 P.2d 779, 782 (Mont. 1957) (prohibition).
280. Mont. Code Ann. § 27–25–102 (certiorari); §§ 27–27–101 to 27–27–104 (prohibition); see
also In re Dewar, 548 P.2d at 153.
281. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 27–25–102(2), 27–27–101; see e.g. Malta Irrigation Dist., 729 P.2d at
1326.  Quasi-judicial decisions involving discretion is one in which the decision maker is, by law, ac-
corded discretion to decide a matter based on a determination of fact.  A non-discretionary matter, i.e., a
ministerial decision, occurs when the law directs the decision maker’s decision, e.g., everyone who
submits a rabies certificate and $5.00 shall be issued a dog license.
282. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–702(1)(a).
283. Mont. Power Co. v. Mont. Pub. Serv. Commn., 26 P.3d 91, 95 (Mont. 2011).  The prerequisites
for judicial review are also applicable to non-MAPA agency judicial review. Id.
284. Vita-Rich Dairy, Inc. v. Dept. of Bus. Reg., 553 P.2d 980, 982–983 (Mont. 1976).
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2. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Generally, if a statute allows an agency to grant relief, the petitioner
must seek relief from that agency before turning to the courts.285  Issues not
raised to the agency generally cannot be raised for the first time on judicial
review.286  Generally, evidence not presented to the agency cannot be con-
sidered by a reviewing court.287  Judicial review is limited to agency deci-
sions, and does not permit the court to substitute its own judgment for that
of the agency’s.  Fact determinations are for the agency and, absent excep-
tional circumstances, a reviewing court cannot hold a fact-finding hear-
ing.288
The exhaustion doctrine serves at least three functions.  First, it pro-
tects agency authority, allowing the agency to act on a matter that the legis-
lature has given it primary decisional power.289  Second, it promotes admin-
285. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–702(1)(a); see also Lincoln Co. v. Sanders Co., 862 P.2d 1133, 1138
(Mont. 1993); Barnicoat v. Commr. of Dept. of Lab. & Indus., 653 P.2d 498, 500 (Mont. 1982); but see
Taylor v. Dept. of Fish, Wildlife & Parks, 666 P.2d 1228, 1232 (Mont. 1983) (where the court action is
based on an original claim for relief, not a matter within the jurisdiction of the agency, exhaustion is not
required); Keller v. Dept. of Revenue, 597 P.2d 736, 739 (Mont. 1979) (non-parties to the administrative
action need not exhaust before seeking judicial review); Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, 426 U.S. 290,
303–304 (1976) (a court, in a properly filed civil matter, may stay the proceeding, and direct the parties
to an administrative agency, who also has jurisdiction, to obtain the specialized or expert perspective of
the agency under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction).
286. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–702(1)(b) (“A party who proceeds before an agency under the terms of
a particular statute may not be precluded from questioning the validity of that statute on judicial review,
but the party may not raise any other question not raised before the agency unless it is shown to the
satisfaction of the court that there was good cause for failure to raise the question before the agency.”).
287. Ostergren v. Dept. of Revenue, 85 P.3d 738, 741 (Mont. 2004); compare Wheelsmith
Fabrication Inc. v. Mont. Dept. of Labor & Indus., 993 P.2d 713, 715 (Mont. 2000) and Schneeman, 848
P.2d at 506–508 with O’Neill v. Dept. of Revenue, 739 P.2d 456, 458–459 (Mont. 1987) (allowing
reviewing court to supplement the agency record under an agency specific statute).  A reviewing court
may look outside the agency record:
(1) to ensure that the agency considered all relevant factors and explained its decision,
(2) when it appears that the agency has relied on documents or materials not included in the
administrative record,
(3) when necessary to explain technical terms or complex subject matter involved in agency
action, and
(4) when there is a strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior by the agency.
Rock Creek Alliance v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 390 F. Supp. 2d 993, 999 (D. Mont. 2005) (Applying
the APA).
288. See Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–704 (judicial review is to be confined to the record made at the
agency level, but in the event of alleged irregularities in agency procedure not shown in the record
“proof of the irregularities may be taken in the court.”).  In federal administrative law, there is authority
that a reviewing court may hear evidence when the agency fact finding procedures are inadequate, and
when issues not raised before the agency are raised in a proceeding to enforce a non-adjudicatory [non-
quasi-judicial] agency action. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
289. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992) (exhaustion concerns apply with particular
force when the action under review involves exercise of the agency’s discretionary power or when the
agency proceedings in question allow the agency to apply its special expertise).
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istrative and judicial efficiency by allowing an agency to correct its own
errors without judicial interference.290  Third, by allowing the agency to
complete its processes, exhaustion guarantees a more complete administra-
tive record for judicial review.291
There are, however, four situations when exhaustion of an administra-
tive remedy is not required.  These exceptions involve matters that courts
do not consider to be within the expertise of an administrative agency.  In-
deed, courts believe that these issues are within their providence, and in-
clude:  facial challenges to agency jurisdiction;292 facial challenges to the
constitutionality of the agency-enabling or authorizing legislation;293 an is-
sue proposing purely a legal question,294 including a challenge to the valid-
ity of the statute that served as the basis for the agency action;295 and when
recourse to an agency will be futile or the available administrative remedies
are inadequate.296
Regarding the final issue, the mere possibility of an adverse adminis-
trative decision does not constitute futility or inadequacy of the administra-
tive remedy.297  In the first three situations, if the legal issue involves fact-
finding or is a mixed question of fact and law, agency exhaustion is re-
quired prior to judicial review.298  Because a purpose of an administrative
agency is to gather and apply specialized knowledge and expertise to a
290. Shoemaker v. Denke, 84 P.3d 4, 7–8 (Mont. 2004); Barnicoat, 653 P.2d at 500 (petitioner failed
to utilize agency rehearing and appeal processes provided by statute and therefore failed to exhaust
agency remedies).
291. See Qwest Corp. v. Dept. of Public Serv. Reg., 174 P.3d 496, 501 (Mont. 2007) (“Judicial
appraisal of agency action stands on surer footing when it takes place in the context of a specific factual
record. . . .  Certainly both the District Court and this Court would benefit from further factual develop-
ment of the issues presented.”).
292. Paulson v. Flathead Conserv. Dist., 91 P.3d 569, 575 (Mont. 2004) (a court may question and
reverse an agency’s determination of jurisdiction when: “(1) the agency’s jurisdiction is plainly lacking;
(2) clear evidence exists that requiring a party to exhaust its remedies will result in irreparable injury;
[and] (3) and the agency’s special expertise will be of no help on the question of jurisdiction.”).
293. Larson v. State, 534 P.2d 854, 858 (Mont. 1975) (when a constitutional charge is made to the
statute on its face there is no need for agency fact finding or the application of specialized agency
understanding).
294. Shoemaker, 84 P.3d at 8; Taylor, 666 P.2d at 1232.  Like with jurisdictional and constitutional
challenges, a court should not intervene absent exhaustion, unless the legal issue can be resolved without
fact finding.  Where the legal issue involves the agency’s special expertise the court should initially
defer to the agency. See e.g. Roadway Express Inc. v. Kingsley, 179 A.2d 729, 731 (N.J. 1962) (when
the agency has specialized or expert knowledge, a court should initially defer to the agency, and review
the agency ruling, if necessary, after exhaustion).
295. Mont. Code Ann § 2–4–702(1)(b).
296. Mt. Water Co. v. Mont. Dept. of Pub. Serv. Reg., 110 P.3d 20, 22 (Mont. 2005).
297. Id.
298. City of Billings Police Dept. v. Owen, 127 P.3d 1044, 1048 (Mont. 2006) (mixed questions of
law and fact); Shoemaker, 84 P.3d at 9 (questions of both law and fact regarding a constitutional issue).
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given problem or dispute, courts should not intervene prematurely when
administrative informed judgment is important to decision making.299
3. Final Agency Action
Courts may review only final agency decisions.  An order is final
“when it imposes an obligation, denies a right, or fixes some legal relation-
ship as a consummation of the administrative process.”300  This standard
allows agencies at the lowest level to make decisions that might be re-
viewed and reversed by higher ranking agency officials, without fear that
preliminary, procedural, or intermediate decisions will be subject to court
intervention before the agency makes its final decision.301  The typical
MAPA contested-case procedure illustrates this rule.  To move the case to
hearing, the agency or its appointed hearings officer may need to rule on
procedure, evidence, discovery, or motions, etc.  These rulings are not sub-
ject to immediate judicial review because they do not represent final agency
actions.  Indeed, the hearings officer’s proposed decision is not a final
agency action—it is merely a proposal, which may or may not be adopted
by the agency.  Once the agency acts on the proposed decision, however, it
has made a final agency decision, and the case is ready for judicial review,
along with the preliminary, procedural, or intermediate decisions of the
hearings officer and the agency which led to the final decision.
The final agency decision rule is not absolute, however.  If a final
agency action will not provide an opportunity for judicial review, then a
preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action is subject to judicial
review.302  Additionally, if the appellant will suffer significant or irrepara-
ble harm from a preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action ju-
dicial review is appropriate.303  However, immediate judicial review is not
available if the allegation of harm is merely speculation that further agency
action may take place and if it takes place, it may have legal conse-
quences.304  The alleged harm must be clear and immediate.  Alternatively,
299. Cf. Owen, 127 P.3d at 1048 (issue of law); Shoemaker, 84 P.3d at 9 (issue of law); Taylor, 666
P.2d at 1232 (issue of law); Brisendine v. St. Dept. of Com., Bd. of Dentistry, 833 P.2d 1019, 1021–1022
(Mont. 1992) (constitutional issue).
300. N. Plains Resource Council v. Bd. of Natl. Resources & Conserv., 594 P.2d 297, 307 (Mont.
1979).
301. Id. at 306; see also Franklin v. Mass., 505 U.S. 788, 796–797 (1992); Dalton v. Specter, 511
U.S. 462, 469–470 (1994) (preliminary decisions by the Secretary of Commerce were not final because
the President of the United States made the final decision).
302. See e.g. Qwest Corp., 174 P.3d at 502 (“When an agency has not adjudicated the issues raised
on appeal, there is no final agency action upon which a district court can assume jurisdiction.”)
303. See e.g. id.
304. Id.
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if an agency fails to provide fundamental fairness and due process, immedi-
ate judicial review is appropriate.305
4. Ripeness
The legal doctrine of ripeness is not specifically addressed in the
MAPA, but the Montana Supreme Court has relied on the doctrine as a
basis for rejecting judicial review in MAPA cases.  Ripeness is grounded in
the Article III, “case and controversy” provision of the United States Con-
stitution that prohibits federal courts from deciding abstract or theoretical
disputes or rendering advisory opinions.  The underlying principle of ripe-
ness as applied to administrative law is that agency action becomes clearer
as it is implemented, and a reviewing court will be more informed by wait-
ing to see the impact of that action on a challenging party.306  Conse-
quently, to decide if an issue is ripe for judicial review, the reviewing court
must consider whether: (1) delayed review would cause hardship to the ap-
pellant, (2) immediate review would inappropriately interfere with further
administrative action, and (3) the court would benefit from further factual
development of the issues presented by allowing additional agency ac-
tion.307
In Qwest Corporation v. Department of Public Service Regulation, the
Public Service Commission (“PSC”) ordered Qwest to submit rate informa-
tion and Qwest sought reconsideration.308  The PSC denied the request, and
Qwest sought judicial review.  On the same day, the PSC filed a complaint
in district court seeking to compel Qwest to comply with its order and re-
questing fines and penalties against Qwest for its failure to supply the infor-
mation.  The district court determined that the issues were ripe for review
and after the district court ruled in favor of Qwest, the PSC appealed.309
The Montana Supreme Court reversed, concluding that Qwest would
not suffer any hardship, because it was obligated to submit the information,
and what the PSC “might” do with information was not currently an appro-
priate matter for judicial review.  The Court said that an agency action is
not ripe “if no legal consequences, rights or duties flow from an agency’s
actions because those actions are merely a step that could lead to a recom-
mended change of the status quo,” even if that change is serious and may
have severe consequences.310  The Court said that the PSC had a number of
options regarding what to do with the requested information.  But the Court
305. Wilson v. Dept. of Pub. Serv. Reg., 858 P.2d 368, 371 (Mont. 1993).
306. Qwest Corp., 174 P.3d at 500.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 499.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 500–501 (internal citations omitted).
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refused to speculate on the future agency action or deny the agency the
opportunity to apply its expertise.  Finally, the Court noted that there was
no “specific factual record” before it, and “[j]udicial appraisal of agency
action stands on surer footing when it takes place in the context of a spe-
cific factual record.”311
5. Standing
The issue of legal standing presents not whether an issue is appropriate
for judicial review but whether the petitioner is an appropriate person or
entity to raise the issue. Generally, standing is not a problem because the
agency order will be directed at a particular party.  In such a situation, the
aggrieved party is the appropriate person or entity to raise the issue and has
standing for judicial review.312  But often an agency decision will have an
impact on those who are not parties to the administrative proceeding, yet
those non-parties seek judicial review.  This situation involves standing as a
constitutional doctrine.  The other situation occurs when either a party or
non-party seeks judicial review of an agency action but the issue raised is
not cognizable under the agency’s authorizing or enabling statute.  This sec-
ond situation involves standing vis-a`-vis the particular statute.
Standing is an extremely complicated and multi-faceted issue of law,
and exhaustive coverage is beyond the scope of this article.  But because
standing issues continue to arise in administrative judicial review, it is
worth brief consideration here.
i. Standing as a Constitutional Doctrine
The first portion of standing is based on the Article III313 constitutional
directive that authorizes courts to hear and resolve only “cases” and “con-
troversies.”314  Because courts may only address actual cases and contro-
versies, the United States Supreme Court and the Montana Supreme Court
have developed standards to determine whether a matter brought to it for
consideration is an actual “case” or “controversy.”  Without addressing all
of these constitutional standards, it is clear that for a court to address a
matter, the person bringing the action must have suffered an “injury” that
311. Id. (internal citations omitted).
312. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–702(1)(a).
313. Article III of the United States Constitution creates and authorizes the Federal Courts as a
branch of the federal government and determines the jurisdiction of those courts.
314. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992).
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was “caused” by the challenged action, and the challenged action can be
“redressed” by a favorable decision of the court.315
A cognizable “injury” must be concrete, particularized, and present a
past, or imminent harm.  The injury must not only have occurred or be
imminent to the person bringing the action, but the injury must be unique or
particularized to that person.  Normally, the parties to the original adminis-
trative action are persons or entities who have or will suffer a concrete,
particularized, and past, present, or imminent harm.  However, often admin-
istrative actions have ripple effects.  For example, an agency decision re-
garding the methods for containing and transferring gasoline by service sta-
tions may result in the increased cost of gasoline at the pump.  But this cost
is probably not sufficient injury to give a general member of the public
standing to seek judicial review of the agency action.  For standing, the
person or entity316 bringing the action must be able to demonstrate that her
injury was in some way particular to her, of a kind or magnitude not suf-
fered by the public at-large.317
The causation element requires proving that the agency action was the
cause-in-fact of the petitioner’s injury; there must be a causal connection
between the asserted unlawful conduct and the alleged injury.318
Redressability demands that the relief requested will address the al-
leged harm.  The test requires that if the agency acts as petitioner requests,
315. In federal court: “First, plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury-in-fact’—an invasion of a le-
gally-protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) “actual or imminent, not
‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’  Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the
conduct complained of—the injury has to be ‘fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the
defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.’
. . .  Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a
favorable decision.’” Id. at 560–561 (internal citations omitted).  In Montana state court: “To establish
standing . . . the complaining party must (1) clearly allege past, present, or threatened injury . . .  and (2)
allege an injury that is distinguishable from the injury to the public generally, though the injury need not
be exclusive to the complaining party.  [However,] persons who fail to allege any personal interest or
injury, beyond that common interest of all citizens and taxpayers, lack standing.  [Thus, the] injury
alleged must be personal to the plaintiff as distinguished from the community in general . . . [and] result
in a ‘concrete adverseness’ personal to the party staking a claim in the outcome.” Fleenor v. Darby Sch.
Dist., 128 P.3d 1048, 1050 (Mont. 2006).
316. An association of individuals, whether composed of people or other interest groups, has stand-
ing to assert injury to the association itself and to represent the interests or injuries of its members.  To
have standing to sue on behalf of members at least one of the members must have standing to sue, the
interest of the members the organization seeks to protect must be germane to the purpose of the organi-
zation, and neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested must require the participation of individual
members in the lawsuit. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Commn., 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977); Friends
of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000); Intl. Union v. Brock,
477 U.S. 274, 281–282 (1986).
317. See Fleenor, 128 P.3d at 1050; see also Bd. of Trustees, Cut Bank Pub. Schs. v. Cut Bank
Pioneer Press, 160 P.3d 482, 485 (Mont. 2007).
318. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753 n. 19 (1984).
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the agency will remedy the alleged injury.319  Typically, if the plaintiff’s
injury was caused by the challenged action of the defendant, the injury is
fairly traceable to the defendant and the requested judicial relief will ad-
dress the injury.320
ii. Standing as a Matter of Statutory Interpretation
Apart from Article III constitutional considerations, a person seeking
judicial review of an administrative decision based on an alleged statute
violation must demonstrate that the interest asserted is recognized by the
statute itself.321  Since legislative bodies have the power to create legally
cognizable rights and interests by enactments of law, they have the power to
determine the nature and extent of the interests created or protected.  In this
context, “statutory” standing asks whether a plaintiff’s cause of action or
claim for relief is recognizable by the statute and, thus, involves judicial
determination of legislative intent.  “Statutory” standing requires that the
plaintiff’s asserted interest fall within the “zone of interests” protected or
regulated by the statute.
For example, in Air Courier Conference v. Postal Workers Union,322
the Postal Workers Union brought a federal court suit challenging an action
of the United States Postal Service.323  The United States Supreme Court
considered whether the Union’s asserted interest—protection of jobs—was
recognized by the specific congressional enactment that formed the basis of
the suit.  The Court determined that the federal postal statute was not en-
acted to protect jobs and did not recognize an interest in job protection.
Consequently, the Court held that the Union had no standing to bring the
jobs issue.324
319. Id.
320. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 168–171 (1997) (the Bureau of Land Management water
restrictions were fairly traceable to its biological opinion and a court order invalidating that opinion
would make it  “likely” the Bureau would eliminate the restriction); see also Mass. v. Envtl. Protection
Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 523–525 (2007) (the Petitioner challenged the EPA’s denial to regulate green-
house gas emissions, but the Court determined that the emissions were fairly traceable to global warm-
ing because they make a meaningful contribution to such overall emissions and a reduction in the chal-
lenged emissions would slow the progress of global emission increases); but see Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40–46 (1976) (no substantial likelihood that a remedial order from the agency
would result in plaintiff’s recovery of the hospital treatment they desired).
321. See e.g. Air Courier Conf. v. Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517, 519 (1991).
322. Id.
323. Id. at 520.
324. Id. at 530.
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iii. Standing in a Quasi-Judicial Matter before an Administrative
Agency
On occasion, in an agency quasi-judicial administrative proceeding
against a person or entity brought by another person or entity, the respon-
dent will allege that the complainant does not have standing to bring the
action.  For example, assume a complainant brings a Montana state political
practices complaint against a Montana politician.  The matter is pending
before the Montana Commissioner of Political Practices.  Does the com-
plainant have to satisfy the constitutional standing requirements to pursue
the matter?  The respondent, politician, alleges that the complainant does
not live or work in the geographical area served by the politician and thus
did not suffered a cognizable “injury” as a consequence of the alleged
wrongful act or conduct, and thus does not have standing to bring the com-
plaint.
While a significant legal issue is presented, it is not an issue of consti-
tutional standing.  The injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability issues
arise from the constitutional limitation on the judiciary to hear only “cases
and controversies.”  There is no such constitutional limitation applicable to
administrative proceedings.  An agency’s authority to act is conferred by
statute, and arises from a delegation by the legislature, not the Judiciary
provision of the state or federal Constitutions.
The legal issue presented is not constitutional standing but rather
whether the complaint states a claim for relief under the agency’s authoriz-
ing or enabling legislation.  This question is very similar to the concern
addressed by the zone-of-interests test discussed above—e.g., whether peti-
tioner’s claim and this particular petitioner are recognized by the statute that
creates the claim for relief.  Thus, in the political practices hypothetical, the
statutory interpretation issue is whether the authorizing or enabling legisla-
tion, under which the Commissioner may act, recognizes this particular
claim and this particular complainant.  If the statute provides that only per-
sons residing and voting within a politician’s political district may bring
such a complaint, then, assuming there are no other constitutional issues,
the particular complainant residing and voting in another district would not
be able to bring the complaint.  Alternatively, if the statute provides that
“any person” may bring a complaint, it would appear that the complainant
satisfies the statutory standard.
C. MAPA Scope of Judicial Review
The scope of judicial review involves the determination of both when
the reviewing court will grant discretion to an agency and the amount of
discretion that will be accorded.  Agency discretion has long been recog-
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nized by the courts, and modern administrative statutes compel continued
judicial discretion to agencies.  Finally, as a matter of policy, discretion is
necessary because courts do not have the ability, in either time or expertise,
to review every administrative action de novo.
If courts had the resources to conduct de novo review of every admin-
istrative decision, there would be little reason to have administrative agen-
cies.325  The Montana Supreme Court has reversed a district court because
the lower court failed to appreciate its narrow and proper326 role on judicial
review of an agency decision.327  The Court explained that the district court
could have reversed or modified the agency decision if it was not supported
by fact or law, or it could have remanded the case to the agency for addi-
tional proceedings, but it could not simply substitute its own analysis for
that of the agency.328
A corollary issue, other than when the reviewing court will grant dis-
cretion and the amount of discretion accorded, is what language the review-
ing court will use to express the discretion accorded.  The legal terminology
or language used to express discretion is confusing, somewhat inconsistent,
and meaningful only in the context of its application.
Review of agency decisions generally involves factual or legal issues
arising in two contexts: agency quasi-judicial decisions including contested
cases and agency quasi-legislative rulemaking decisions.  Quasi-judicial
processes result in decisions or orders; quasi-legislative processes result in
rules.  The issue on judicial review may involve an agency’s exercise of
discretion in procedure or determination of policy.329  The key to under-
standing the scope of judicial review is determining when the reviewing
court will defer to an agency decision or action, the amount of deference
that will be accorded, and the proper terminology or language that the re-
viewing court will use to express the deference accorded.  The final portion
325. It is generally recognized that agencies are created and authorized by the legislature for the
following reasons: (1) to relieve the courts and the legislature from the sheer volume of work that would
be necessary in the absence of such agencies, (2) to have decisions made by a body that specializes in
such matters, and/or has staff expertise in making these decisions, (3) for agencies with national or state
wide jurisdiction, to assure uniformity of decision making, (contrasted with the alternative of a patch-
work of court decisions within the same geographical area), (4) to have a decision from a decision maker
who is sympathetic to a particular cause or group (contrasted with the merely umpiring function of a
court), (5) to continually supervise a particular subject area over time to assure uniformity and that its
decisions remain current with changes in science, technology, economics and social norms, (6) to enable
more direct public participation than would be possible if the public was required to deal with only the
courts, legislature, or executive. See 73 C.J.S Public Admin. Law and Proc. § 12 (2012); 2 Am. Jur. 2d
Administrative Law §§ 3–4 (2012).
326. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–704(2).
327. O’Neill, 49 P.3d at 47.
328. Id.
329. See Mont. Socy. of Anesthesiologists, 171 P.3d at 712 (an administrative board’s interpretation
of statutes which fall under its domain should be given deference) (dictum).
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of this article addresses the when judicial deference to agency decisions is
appropriate, the appropriate amount of deference, and the terminology asso-
ciated with judicial deference.
1. Scope of Review—MAPA Agency Rules
A reviewing court may invalidate a MAPA agency rule if it is not
consistent with the agency authorizing or enabling legislation;330 it is not
“reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the statute;”331 “its
threatened application interferes with or impairs or threatens to interfere
with or impair the legal rights or privileges of the plaintiff;”332 it was
adopted with an “arbitrary or capricious disregard for the purpose of the
authorizing statute;”333 or it was not “adopted in substantial compliance
with” the MAPA rulemaking procedure.334
The above standards may be reduced to the following: A reviewing
court will overrule an agency rule when the rule is not consistent with the
agency authorizing or enabling legislation, e.g., there is an arbitrary or ca-
pricious disregard for the intent of the legislature, is contrary to other legal
rights (common law, statutory or constitutional), the rule was not properly
adopted pursuant to the MAPA rulemaking procedure, or the rule is not
necessary to effect the purpose of the authorizing statute.  While important,
generally, the issue on appeal does not concern compliance with the MAPA
rulemaking procedure or the necessity of the rule.  Typically, the issue is
whether the resulting rule is consistent with and not adopted in arbitrary and
capricious disregard for the intent of the legislature.
To determine whether a rule is consistent with the underlying statute,
the court must determine whether the rule was based on a consideration of
the relevant factors intended by the legislature.  If not, the agency has made
a clear error of judgment.335  A rule is inconsistent with legislative intent if
it engrafts requirements on the statute that was rejected or not contemplated
by the legislature, or fails to address criteria that the legislature intended the
agency to consider.336
330. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–305(6)(a).
331. Id. at § 2–4–305(6)(b).
332. Id. at § 2–4–506(1).
333. Id. at § 2–4–506(2); see also Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. Mont. Bd. of Envtl. Rev., 199 P.3d 191,
198 (Mont. 2008).
334. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–305(7) (“substantial compliance” is based on compliance with Mont.
Code Ann. §§ 2–4–302 to 2–4–303, and 2–4–306).
335. Clark Fork Coalition v. Mont. Dept. of Envtl. Quality, 197 P.3d 482, 486–487 (Mont. 2008).
336. Bick v. Mont. Dept. of Just., Div. of Motor Veh., 730 P.2d 418, 421 (Mont. 1986).  In the
leading United States Supreme Court case, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm
Mutual Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983), on judicial review of an agency rule under “arbitrary and
capricious” standard, the Court said the agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfac-
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Regarding the initial issue of what an agency rule means, a reviewing
court will give the agency’s interpretation of its own rule considerable def-
erence.337  Indeed, if person or entity has a question regarding how an
agency interprets one of its own rules, or will interpret a rule, counsel may
seek a declaratory ruling from the agency, and the agency is compelled to
respond.338
2. Scope of Review—Agency Quasi-Judicial Decisions
As a general rule, all MAPA and non-MAPA quasi-judicial agency
decisions,339 both formal and informal, are subject to judicial review.340
Judicial review is based on the record from which the agency made its deci-
sion.341  On review, the court studies the agency record to determine
whether (1) the agency findings of fact are properly supported by the record
evidence, (2) the agency interpretations of law are correct, (3) the agency
properly applied law to fact, and (4) the agency has not abused its discretion
on matters where the court accords the agency discretion.342
i. The Scope of Judicial Review of MAPA Contested Cases
The MAPA provides that in all contested cases:
tory explanation for its action including a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice
made.  In reviewing that explanation we must ‘consider whether the decision was based on a considera-
tion of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error judgment.’  Normally, an agency
rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not in-
tended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explana-
tion for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or its explanation is so implausi-
ble that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.”  This
standard is consistent with that of the Montana Court and it provides a more complete list of valid
considerations for reviewing agency rules.
337. Easy v. Mont. Dept. of Natl. Res. & Conserv., 752 P.2d 746, 748 (Mont. 1988).
338. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–501.
339. There are two types of administrative agencies that make quasi-judicial decisions: (1) Regula-
tory agencies—agencies that regulate some economic, political or social issue; and (2) Benefactory
agencies—agencies that distribute government money or other benefits (the issues typically are who is
entitled to benefits and, if entitled, what is the amount of entitlement).
340. See Johansen, 955 P.2d at 659 (The Court recognized that MAPA contested case decisions are
subject to judicial review under Part 7, but also said: “Simply because an administrative decision is not a
‘contested case,’ however, does not mean that [the petitioner] has no avenue to seek review of the
Department’s decision.”  The court then reviewed its jurisprudence concerning its power to review non-
MAPA administrative decisions.).  However, under federal law some purely discretionary agency deci-
sions are not reviewable.
341. Generally, reviewing courts do not take additional evidence but review the agency decision
based on the record made by the agency. But see Skyline Sportsmen’s Ass’n. v. State Bd. of Land
Commrs., 951 P.2d 29, 32 (Mont. 1997).
342. E.g. Hughes v. Mont. Bd. of Medical Examiners, 80 P.3d 415 (2003) (an agency “has wide
latitude in deciding whether to reconsider a prior action.”).
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(2) The court may reverse or modify the agency decision if substantial rights
of the appellant have been prejudiced because:
(a) the agency findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(i) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(ii) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(iii) made upon unlawful procedure;
(iv) affected by other error of law;
(v) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substan-
tial evidence on the whole record;
(vi) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or
clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; or
(b) findings of fact, upon issues essential to the decision, were not made
although requested.343
The first four of the above standards address issues of law, while the
remaining two standards address agency fact-finding.  Of course, where an
agency authorizing or enabling statute provides different standards of re-
view, the procedural requirements of that statute prevail over MAPA con-
tested case judicial review.344  In judicial review of a contested case, the
court must determine whether the substantial rights of the appellant have
been prejudiced because the agency exceeded its authority, abused its dis-
cretion, made clearly erroneous findings of fact, or interpreted the law in-
correctly.345  While the court is to review both findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law, it is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.346
Indeed, the Montana Supreme Court has recognized that courts should defer
to an agency’s decision where substantial agency expertise is involved.347
The MAPA informal contested case proceedings348 are subject to judi-
cial review in the same manner as formal contested case proceedings.349
ii. Review of MAPA Agency Findings of Fact: Substitution of
Judgment on Weight of Evidence, Remand for
Additional Evidence
The reviewing court “may not substitute its judgment for that of an
agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.”350  If a court
concludes the agency fact-finding was inadequate for review, it may re-
mand the matter to the agency for additional evidence and fact-finding.351
343. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–704(2).
344. Pickens, 3 P.3d at 606.
345. Marble, 9 P.3d at 620.
346. Great Falls Pub. Schs. v. Johnson, 26 P.3d 734, 737 (Mont. 2001) (citing Baldridge v. Bd. of
Trustees, Rosebud Co. Sch. Dist. No. 19, Colstrip, 870 P.2d 711, 714 (Mont. 1994)).
347. Owens, 172 P.3d at 1231.
348. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–604.
349. Id. at § 2–4–604(5).
350. Id. at § 2–4–704(2).
351. Id.
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Additionally, if before the judicial review hearing, the reviewing court re-
ceives, via motion, an “application,” it may order the agency to receive
additional evidence if it determines that the evidence is “material” and there
is “good reason” for the failure to initially present it to the agency.352  Upon
receipt of the new evidence, the agency may modify its findings and deci-
sion, and file the new evidence and its modified decision to the reviewing
court.353
iii. Clear Error Test for Reviewing Fact
Courts review MAPA agency findings of fact under the “clearly erro-
neous” standard.354  The clearly erroneous standard is the standard that fed-
eral and state courts use to review the findings of fact made by a trial court
judge sitting without a jury.355  In State Compensation Mutual Insurance
Fund v. Lee Rost Logging,356 the Montana Supreme Court, reviewing a
Workers’ Compensation Court decision, said of the clearly erroneous test:
We adopt the following three-part test to determine if a finding is clearly
erroneous.  First, the Court will review the record to see if the findings are
supported by substantial evidence.  Second, if the findings are supported by
substantial evidence, we will determine if the trial court has misapprehended
the effect of evidence.  Third, if substantial evidence exists and the effect of
the evidence has not been misapprehended, the Court may still find that “[A]
352. Id. at § 2–4–703.
353. See Wage Claim of Holbeck v. Stevi-West, Inc., 783 P.2d 391, 395 (Mont. 1989) (allegation that
interested party witness was unavailable to attend administrative hearing is an insufficient reason for
remand to agency for additional fact finding); Pannoni, 90 P.3d at 449–450 (Mont. 2004) (reports of
new experts sought after the administrative hearing does not constitute “good reason” for remand).
While not involving a MAPA state agency, and thus not subject to MAPA, in Flathead Citizens for
Quality Growth, Inc. v. Flathead Co. Bd. of Adjustment, 175 P.3d 282, 294–295 (Mont. 2008), the Court
states that a reviewing court may remand to the agency for additional and appropriate fact finding.
354. Some Montana agencies are governed by statutes that provide for review of agency fact-finding
under the “substantial evidence” standard rather than the MAPA clearly erroneous standard.  For exam-
ple, the Montana Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act provides that on judicial review of a Board
of Personnel Appeals decision, the court is to apply the “substantial evidence rule in reviewing the
Board’s fact findings.” See Mont. Code Ann. § 39–31–409(4) (“The findings of the board with respect
to questions of fact, if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole, shall be
conclusive.”).  Despite the statutory language, in Ekalaka Unified Bd. of Trustees v. Ekalaka Teachers’
Assn., 149 P.3d 902, 904 (Mont. 2006), the Court improperly applied the clearly erroneous standard in
stating: “We review agency findings to determine whether they are clearly erroneous . . . .” (citing Mont.
Code Ann. § 2–4–704(2)); see also Wolny v. City of Bozeman, 30 P.3d 1085, 1088 (Mont. 2001) (in a
judicial review of a Bozeman police commission decision, the Court stated scope of review is “substan-
tial evidence” for questions of fact.  Then, the Court stated that the district court should defer to the
Commission’s findings of fact unless they are “clearly erroneous.”  The Court incorrectly stated that
judicial review is governed by MAPA.  This appears to be inaccurate because the agency, the Bozeman
police commission, is not an “agency of state government.”).
355. U.S. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948); Kis v. Pifer, 588 P.2d 514, 518 (Mont.
1978) (citing Mont. R. Civ. P. 52).
356. State Compen. Mut. Ins. Fund v. Lee Rost Logging, 827 P.2d 85 (Mont. 1992).
48
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finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when, although there is evidence to support it, a
review of the record leaves the court with the definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been committed.”357
The Court later clarified that this interpretation of the clearly erroneous
standard applies to the review of agency fact determinations in contested
cases.358
The first part of the test asks whether there is a “substantial’ amount of
evidence, on the record as a whole, to support the agency finding of fact.
The test examines both the quantity and quality of evidence.359  Substantial
credible evidence is such evidence that a reasonable mind could accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, even if it is contradicted by other evi-
dence—somewhat less than a preponderance or inherently weak.360
If the “reasonable mind” standard is satisfied, the reviewing court then
asks whether the agency misapprehended (did not understand) the effect of
the evidence.  The Montana Supreme Court cited two federal Court of Ap-
peals cases for the “misapprehend the effect” standard.  In one of those
cases, Narragansett Improvement Company v. United States,361 a civil
bench trial, the First Circuit, after concluding that the trial judge did not
understand the “import or effect” of the evidence, reversed the trial judge’s
findings of fact.362
Finally, if there is substantial evidence and the administrative fact-
finder properly understood the effect of the evidence, a Montana reviewing
court may nonetheless reverse if it is left with the definite and firm convic-
tion that a mistake has been made.363  This overall test must be applied
357. Lee Rost Logging, 827 P.2d at 102 (quoting Interstate Production Credit Ass’n of Great Falls v.
DeSaye, 820 P.2d 1285, 1287 (Mont. 1991) (internal citations omitted).
358. See e.g. Synek v. St. Compen. Mut. Ins. Fund, 900 P.2d 884, 886 (Mont. 1995).
359. While the term “substantial” is normally used to address quantity, when it is used as a standard
of review, it speaks to both quantity and quality.  Indeed, when the Montana Supreme Court directs the
reviewing court to consider both the evidence that supports a finding as well as the evidence that does
not do so, the process necessarily involves an element of quality consideration. See Owens, 172 P.3d at
1230.
360. See Tinker v. Mont. State Fund, 211 P.3d 194, 201 (Mont. 2009).
361. Narragansett Improvement Co., 290 F.2d at 580–581.
362. The fact question before the trial judge was whether a contract, the contractor, or the landowner
had the duty to perform certain work on a tract of land.  The contract said the contractor was to “finish
the job as of October 15, 1958.”  The original fact-finder treated the import of the October date only in
relation to completion date of the project.  The Court of Appeals disagreed; it said the “import” or
“effect” of the October date was that the contractor took the project as of that date and agreed to perform
all work necessary to complete the project, including the work in dispute.
363. Interstate Prod. Credit Ass’n of Great Falls, 820 P.2d at 1287 (quoting U.S. Gypsum Co., 333
U.S. at 395).  Alternatively, federal courts review federal agency findings of fact from trial-type hear-
ings (akin to an MAPA contested case proceeding) under the “substantial evidence” standard.  Applying
the “substantial evidence” standard, the reviewing court is to view the whole record, considering both
the evidence that supports the agency’s findings and the evidence that runs contrary to those findings.
Ultimately, agency findings are supported by substantial evidence if there is “such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S.
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consistent with the MAPA requirement364 that a reviewing court is not to
substitute its judgment for the agency’s as to the overall “weight of the
evidence.”365  Regarding fact questions as to witness credibility and matters
within the agency experience, technical competence, and specialized knowl-
edge, a reviewing court is to defer to the person who heard the evidence on
credibility and to the agency’s technical competence and specialized knowl-
edge when such deference is due.366
iv. Review of a MAPA Agency Contested Case Conclusions of
Law—Interpretation and Application of Law to Fact
The Montana Supreme Court has held that agency conclusions of law
are reviewed to determine if they are correct; whether the agency correctly
interpreted the law367 and whether it correctly applied law to fact.368  In
at 477.  In applying the “reasonable mind” standard, the reviewing court is not to substitute its judgment
for that of the agency, particularly when the factual inquiry involves matters that the agency is
“equipped or informed . . . by expertness which courts do not possess and therefore must respect.  Nor
does it mean that even as to matters not requiring expertise a court may displace the Board’s choice
between two fairly conflicting views, even though the court would justifiably have made a different
choice had the matter been before it de novo.” Id. at 488.  The Court did conclude that federal courts
should reverse a federal agency decision on fact “when the standard appears to have been misappre-
hended or grossly misapplied.” Id. at 491.  Compare this language with the second step of the Montana
Supreme Court’s definition of the “clear error” test.  The Court also said that an agency finding of fact
decision should be reversed when “the record . . . precludes the [agency’s] decision from being justified
by a fair estimate of the worth of the testimony of witnesses or its informed judgment on matters within
its special competence or both.” Id. at 490.  Compare this statement with the Montana Supreme Court’s
third test under the MAPA clearly erroneous test.
364. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–704(2).
365. Total Mechanical Heating & Air Conditioning v. Employee Relations Div. Uninsured Employ-
ment Fund, 50 P.3d 108, 113 (Mont. 2002).
366. See e.g. Knowles v. State ex rel. Lindeen, 222 P.3d 595, 603 (Mont. 2009).
367. Kalfell Ranch, Inc. v. Prairie Co. Coop. St. Grazing Dist., 15 P.3d 888, 891–892 (Mont. 2000);
Denke v. Shoemaker, 198 P.3d 284, 294–295 (Mont. 2008).  Alternatively, reviewing federal courts will
give deference to federal agency interpretations of law when such deference is due.  For example, defer-
ence will be given an agency’s interpretation of law when “the agency has participated in the legislative
activity resulting in its authorization.” Hi-Craft Clothing Co. v. N.L.R.B., 660 F.2d 910, 916 (3d Cir.
1981).  The agency interpretation is “longstanding” and parties (and apparently Congress) have come to
rely on the interpretation, or when the construction involves “a technical area . . . and Congress has
specifically designated the agency as the primary source for the interpretation . . . .” Id. at 915.  Alterna-
tively, there is no reason for deference when the issue falls outside the agency’s expertise, (e.g., involves
the interpretation of the Constitution, common law, matters that are the grist for the courts, or other
similar areas of law).  Accordingly, courts give agency interpretations deference when deference is due.
But, when deference is not due, the court will decide the matter without according the agency’s interpre-
tation any deference.  Finally, federal courts under Chevron deference will absolutely defer to agency
interpretations of their authorizing or enabling legislation when the reviewing court determines that
Congress did not indicate any intent on the matter. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Resources Def. Coun-
cil, 467 U.S. 837, 842–844 (1984).  Thereafter in Stinson v. U.S., 508 U.S. 36, 44 (1993), the Supreme
Court explained that “[u]nder Chevron . . . if a statute is unambiguous the statute governs; if, however,
Congress’ silence or ambiguity has ‘left a gap for the agency to fill,’ courts must defer to the agency’s
interpretation so long as it is ‘a permissible construction of the statute.’”
50
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sum, this standard leaves little or no discretion to the agency on matters of
law.  But courts will defer to agency conclusions of law when deference is
due.  For example, when an agency’s interpretation of a statute has stood
unchallenged by the legislature for a considerable length of time, courts will
regard that interpretation as having great importance in arriving at the
proper construction.369  Additionally, a reviewing court may defer to
agency conclusions where substantial agency expertise is involved.370
A court should defer when it determines that, based on comparative
qualifications, the agency’s informed judgment on a matter is better than its
own.  Federal courts have relied upon this principle in according deference
when deference is due, but courts have also used this principle to withhold
deference when the court concludes that it, rather than the agency, has the
better perspective on the matter.  In one such case,371 the Second Circuit
listed a number of reasons why not to defer to an agency, including: (1)
when the agency is entirely an umpiring body devoid of legislative policy-
making authority (such as the Montana Workers Compensation Court), (2)
how the agency has gone about its job based on a series of short opinions on
isolated facts which contain no in-depth study of the problem, (3) if the
agency has little experience in the administration of the principle of law—
having developed no great specialization or expertise, and (4) especially
368. Hafner v. Dept. of Lab. & Indus., 929 P.2d 233, 236 (Mont. 1996).  Alternatively, federal courts
accord discretion to agency application of law to fact and, when appropriate, even to agency interpreta-
tions of law. Judge Friendly, speaking for the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
has said “there is an impressive body of law sanctioning free substitution of judicial for administrative
judgment when the question involves the meaning of a statutory term.” Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v.
Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 49 (2d Cir. 1976) (citing United States Supreme Court cases).  The court said
“[l]eading cases support[ ] the view that great deference must be given to the decisions of an administra-
tive agency applying a statute to the facts and that such decisions can be reversed only if without rational
basis.” Pittston Stevedoring Corp., 544 F.2d at 49 (citing several United States Supreme Court cases,
including Grey v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 411–412 (1941)).
369. Glendive Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Dept. of Pub. Health & Human Servs., 49 P.3d 560, 562 (Mont.
2002).
370. Owens, 172 P.3d at 1231; see also Winchell, 972 P.3d at 1135 (deference to agency expertise).
In Winchell, the Court noted that deferral to agency expertise is not a review standard that “we apply in a
contested case,” when reviewing for correctness.  However, judicial recognition that when an agency
has technical expertise, its interpretation of technical language may properly be considered and be com-
pelling when a different interpretation is not mandated by clear conflicting statutory language.  Recogni-
tion that an agency is not the exclusive repository of technical expertise (see Intl. Bhd. of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am. v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566, n. 20 (1979)) does not mean
that there is never judicial recognition of and deferral to agency technical expertise (see Ford Motor
Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 566 (1980).  Moreover, it is questionable why the Montana Court
would defer to agency’s interpretations or applications of law in a non-MAPA contested case, yet defer
to the same agency’s interpretation or application in a non-contested case.  It would appear that as to
questions of law, whether the agency reached the right conclusion would depend more on what the
conclusion was rather than the setting in which the conclusion was reached.  The setting in which the
conclusion of law was reached has little or nothing to do with deciding when to accord deference.
371. Pittston Stevedoring Corp., 544 F.2d at 48–50.
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where the understanding of the law depends on prior judicial decisions and
legislative history matters that the court concludes it has greater compe-
tence.372  Additional factors may include the extent to which the legislature
has delegated policy-making authority to the agency, the court’s impression
of the quality of the particular agency and the thoroughness and expertness
of the agency, the need or value of expertise for the matter under considera-
tion, and whether lawmaking by the court is otherwise needed in the partic-
ular case.373  What is important to understand is that agency specialization
and expertise is not an all-or-nothing concept.  It need not and does not,
exist every time it is asserted by agency counsel or the advocate for the
prevailing party at the agency level.  It is, however, a matter for fair consid-
eration by a reviewing court, and matter opposing counsel may want to
address to the court.
D. Judicial Review of Non-MAPA Agency Quasi-Judicial Decisions
In addition to judicial review of MAPA agency contested cases, the
reader needs to be aware of the standards of judicial review applicable to
Montana state and state subdivision agency non-contested case, quasi-judi-
cial decisions.  These situations are of four types: (1) Montana State MAPA
agencies where a “hearing” is not required by law and the agency’s author-
izing/enabling legislation or constitutional due process does not require a
hearing; (2) Montana State, non-MAPA agencies; (3) Montana State subdi-
vision agencies—agencies of counties and municipalities, school districts,
transportation districts, water districts, etc; and (4) any Montana (MAPA or
non-MAPA) agency when its authorizing or enabling legislation specifies
that a particular standard of review is to be used on judicial review.
Typically, the quasi-judicial agency process will involve agency fact-
finding, but that activity will not be a result of a formal contested case
hearing, but rather an informal hearing or an agency information gathering.
For example, in Johansen,374 the Montana Department of Natural Re-
sources and Conservation leased land to Johansen, and Johansen was to pay
rent for the land.  This case involved a MAPA agency that was required to
make a finding of fact (whether the rent had been timely paid), but was not
required to conduct contested case hearing.
The Court characterized the case as one “where no hearing or other
administrative procedure is provided for.”375  The Court determined that in
such a situation, the proper standard of review is whether the agency deci-
372. Id.
373. See Davis, Administrative Law Text, § 30.06, (3d ed., West 1973).
374. See discussion of Johansen, supra nn. 60–64.
375. Johansen, 955 P.2d at 653.
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sion is based upon any error of law is wholly unsupported by the evidence,
or clearly arbitrary or capricious.376  Thereafter, in its decision, the Court
stated that it would only overturn the agency’s decision if it was “arbitrary,
capricious, unlawful, or unsupported by substantial evidence.”377  Note that
while the specific language of these two review standards is somewhat dif-
ferent, the court treats them as the same.378
The ultimate question is whether the Johansen judicial review standard
accords more or less discretion to the agency decision when compared with
standards used in reviewing a “contested case.”
1. Findings of Fact
It makes no sense that the Court would accord an agency more or less
fact-finding discretion based solely on the formality of the agency fact-find-
ing record.  It certainly makes no sense that the Court would accord more
discretion,379 under the arbitrary, capricious,380 substantial evidence stan-
dard, to agency fact-finding based on an informal fact-finding record, than
when the agency conducts a trial-type contested case hearing.  While the
language or terminology used to articulate the appropriate standards of re-
view are different, (clearly erroneous versus arbitrary, capricious, substan-
tial evidence) ultimately the amount of discretion the Court accords an
agency fact-finding remains the same.  In reviewing agency fact-finding, in
a quasi-judicial matter, the Court essentially reviews the agency fact-find-
ing to determine if a reasonable mind could reach the factual conclusion,
376. Id. at 659.
377. See also Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr., Inc. v. Mont. Dept. of Transp., 994 P.2d 676, 678 (Mont.
2000); Friends of the Wild Swan v. Dept. of Nat. Resources & Conserv., 6 P.3d 972, 976 (Mont. 2000).
For review of a non-MAPA entity, see Madison River R.V. Ltd. v. Ennis, 994 P.2d 1098 (Mont. 2000).
378. In North Fork Preservation Assn. v. Dept. of State Lands, 778 P.2d 862, 871 (Mont. 1989),
cited with approval in Johansen, the Montana Supreme Court analogized to Overton Park, 401 U.S. at
416, a leading United States Supreme Court case, involving judicial review of an agency informal quasi-
judicial decision.  The Overton Park Court used the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review.
379. The Montana Supreme Court has said that it accords Montana State subdivision agencies more
discretion on questions of fact.
380. The Montana Supreme Court has defined the “arbitrary and capricious” standard when applied
to fact questions as: “reversal of the appealed ruling is not permitted merely because the record contains
inconsistent evidence or evidence which might support a different result.  Rather, the decision being
challenged must appear to be random, unreasonable or seemingly unmotivated, based on the existing
record.” Kiely Const., L.L.C. v. City of Red Lodge, 57 P.3d 836, 851 (Mont. 2002).  It is difficult to
differentiate between this standard of review and the clearly erroneous standard.  To ratchet critical
thinking up to an even higher level, the Court has defined the “abuse of discretion” standard of review,
when applied to fact questions, as the agency decision ‘is so lacking in fact and foundation’ that ‘it is
clearly unreasonable.’” North 93 Neighbors, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners of Flathead
County, 137 P.3d 557, 565 (Mont. 2006).  Again, is there any real difference between this standard of
review and the clearly erroneous standard, as defined?  For those readers who are able to appreciate a
practical difference in these standards, you are now ready for teaching law.  As for me, I look forward to
putting it my past.
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whether the agency fact-finder understood the effect of the evidence, and
even if the first two requirements are met, whether the Court is of the defi-
nite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.  Ultimately, without
weighing the weight of the evidence, if the Court has a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made, it will reverse.381  It would be
helpful if the Court formally recognized that regardless of the review stan-
dard—clearly erroneous, substantial evidence, arbitrary capricious, or abuse
of discretion—when it reviews a fact record it looks to see if a reasonable
mind could reach the same conclusion as that of the agency, whether the
agency fact-finder understood the evidence, and regardless of affirmative
answers to the first two questions, whether it was of the definite and firm
conclusion that a mistake had been made.
The real difference in reviewing agency fact-finding in the context of a
formal trial-type record and an informal record is that a formal trial-type
record is more concise, confined, and ultimately more facially accurate.
With the formal trial-type record, the reviewing court has the hearing tran-
script and the exhibits,382 whereas, when reviewing an informal agency
fact-finding record, the court looks at the agency evidentiary in whatever
form it takes.  For example, in the Johansen case, where the State land
lessee did not allegedly pay the rent on time, the record evidence was
whatever was before the agency decision maker at the time he or she deter-
mined that the rent was not timely and cancelled the lease.  All this infor-
mation/evidence was probably contained in the agency’s file.
When the agency information/evidentiary record is derived from other
than a hearing, much less a trial-type hearing, often the record must be
constructed for court review after the agency decision was made,383 and the
exact content of that record may be in controversy.  Regardless, the agency
record on review is the exact factual record384 that was before the agency-
decision-maker at the time of the decision.  Thus, while the agency eviden-
tiary record from a formal trial-type hearing when compared with an agency
381. It may be safe to conclude that, on any topic, when judges reach a “definite and firm convic-
tion” that a mistake has been made, the determination of any subordinate tribunal is in great jeopardy.
382. Mont. Code Ann. § 2–4–702(4) (transmittal of the entire agency record to the reviewing court).
383. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (on judicial review
of an agency decision based on other than a trial-type record, the Court remanded the case to the district
court with instructions to direct the agency to present the whole record on which the agency decision
was based—“the full administrative record that was before the Secretary at the time he made his deci-
sion.”).  The reviewing court may look outside the administrative record produced by the agency unless
the reviewing court looks beyond the record to determine what matters the agency should have consid-
ered, it is impossible for the court to determine whether the agency took into consideration all relevant
factors in reaching its decision. Skyline Sportsmen’s Assoc. v. State Board of Land Commissioners, 951
P. 2d 29, 32 (Mont. 1997).
384. Id.  It is appropriate for a reviewing court to look beyond the record submitted by the agency,
and allow the submission of new evidence, to assure that agency submitted record is complete. Id.
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informal fact-gathering is much different, and clearly the formal record has
more hallmarks of accuracy and is much easier for a reviewing court to
work with, the nature of the record should not change the amount of fact-
finding discretion that the court accords the agency.
2. Conclusions of Law
Regarding judicial review of non-MAPA agency, quasi-judicial deci-
sions of agency conclusions of law, the Montana Court applies the same
level of agency deference as it does in reviewing contested cases; the Court
reviews for “correctness.”385  There certainly is no reason for the Court to
accord an agency more discretion regarding its conclusions of law, solely
on the basis that it has used an informal hearing process or accorded no
hearing at all.  The amount of discretion accorded an agency’s conclusions
of law may not depend upon whether the conclusion was in the context of a
formal or informal quasi-judicial proceeding.
E. Montana Supreme Court Review of a District Court’s Review of an
Agency Decision
The judicial review standards discussed above, address the review
standards used by both a Montana district court and the Montana Supreme
Court.386  Assuming the district court applies the proper standard of review,
and there is an appeal of the district court decision to the Montana Supreme
Court, the higher court uses the same standard of review that the district
court used.  Alternatively, if the Supreme Court determines that the district
court used an incorrect review standard, the higher court will either remand
the decision back to the district courts with instructions to apply the proper
standard of review, or it may apply the proper review standard and deter-
mine whether the agency decision is to be sustained or overruled.
VI. CONCLUSION
The uncertainty that accompanied MAPA at the time of its enactment
in 1971 has been resolved.  The Act works, appears to be universally ac-
385. See Miskovich, 551 P. at 998 (“the proper role of a court reviewing agency conclusions of law
is to ascertain whether the rulings thereon were correct . . . .”).
386. Marble, 9 P.3d at 620 (“A district court reviews an administrative decision in a contested case
to determine whether the substantial right of the appellant have been prejudiced because the agency
exceeded its authority, abused its discretion, made clearly erroneous findings of fact, or interpreted the
law incorrectly.  We employ the same standards when reviewing a district order affirming or reversing
an administrative decision.”); Skyline Sportsmen’s Assn., 951 P. 2d at 32 (In our review of “a district
court’s review of an informal administrative decision, this Court follows the same standard as the district
court, namely, does the record before the administrative body establish it acted arbitrarily, capriciously,
or unlawfully.”)
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cepted, and places the practice of administrative law in Montana on the
same plain as that in other states.  While judicial clarifications and develop-
ment will continue, and some legislative modification may occur, practice
under the MAPA will likely continue to be routine.
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